CVE-2013-4425 in OsiriX
Summary
by MITRE
The DICOM listener in OsiriX before 5.8 and before 2.5-MD, when starting up, encrypts the TLS private key file using "SuperSecretPassword" as the hardcoded password, which allows local users to obtain the private key.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 03/02/2019
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2013-4425 affects the OsiriX medical imaging software, specifically its DICOM listener component that handles secure communications. This flaw represents a critical security weakness in the software's implementation of transport layer security protocols, where the system uses a hardcoded password for encrypting TLS private key files during the startup process. The vulnerability exists in versions prior to 5.8 and 2.5-MD, indicating a long-standing issue that was not addressed in the affected releases. The hardcoded password "SuperSecretPassword" serves as a clear indicator of poor security practices, as it violates fundamental principles of cryptographic key management and creates a predictable weakness that can be easily exploited by local attackers.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from the insecure handling of cryptographic materials within the application's initialization sequence. When OsiriX starts up, it automatically encrypts its TLS private key file using the hardcoded password, which means that any local user with access to the system can potentially extract this password from the application's source code or configuration files. This approach directly violates security best practices outlined in the CWE database under CWE-798, which addresses the use of hardcoded credentials, and CWE-310, which covers cryptographic issues related to weak key derivation. The flaw essentially creates a backdoor mechanism where the encryption key is not only predictable but also trivially discoverable, undermining the entire purpose of using TLS encryption for secure communications.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple credential exposure, as it fundamentally compromises the integrity and confidentiality of communications within the medical imaging environment. Local users who can access the system can obtain the private key used for TLS encryption, which allows them to decrypt communications between the OsiriX application and other systems, potentially intercepting sensitive patient data or even impersonating the system in network communications. This weakness creates a significant risk for healthcare organizations that rely on OsiriX for medical image management, as it could enable unauthorized access to protected health information. The vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1552.001, which covers "Unsecured Credentials" through the use of hardcoded passwords, and represents a critical weakness in the application's defense-in-depth strategy.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate action from system administrators and security teams to upgrade to patched versions of OsiriX, specifically versions 5.8 and 2.5-MD or later. The fix should implement proper key management practices that eliminate the use of hardcoded passwords and instead utilize secure, random key generation with appropriate key derivation functions. Organizations should also implement regular security audits to identify similar hardcoded credentials in other applications and ensure that cryptographic keys are properly managed using established security frameworks such as NIST SP 800-57 for key management practices. Additionally, system administrators should conduct thorough access controls reviews to limit local user privileges and implement monitoring for unusual file access patterns that might indicate attempts to extract cryptographic materials from the system.