CVE-2014-10008 in Stark CRM
Summary
by MITRE
Multiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in Stark CRM 1.0 allow remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that add (1) an administrator via a crafted request to the admin page, (2) an agent via a crafted request to the agent page, (3) a sub-agent via a crafted request to the sub_agent page, (4) a partner via a crafted request to the partner page, or (5) a client via a crafted request to the client page.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 05/13/2025
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-10008 represents a critical cross-site request forgery flaw in Stark CRM 1.0 that enables remote attackers to exploit administrative functions without legitimate authentication. This vulnerability operates under the well-established CWE-352 category for Cross-Site Request Forgery, which specifically addresses the weakness where the application fails to validate that requests originate from legitimate sources. The flaw allows unauthorized actors to manipulate the system's administrative capabilities by crafting malicious requests that appear to come from authenticated administrators, thereby bypassing standard authentication mechanisms.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from the application's failure to implement proper anti-CSRF token validation across multiple administrative endpoints. Attackers can exploit this weakness by constructing specially crafted HTTP requests that target specific administrative pages including admin, agent, sub_agent, partner, and client management interfaces. Each of these endpoints lacks adequate protection mechanisms to verify the authenticity of requests, making them susceptible to manipulation through CSRF attacks. The vulnerability affects the core administrative functionality of the CRM system, potentially allowing attackers to escalate privileges and gain unauthorized control over the application's user management features.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple unauthorized access, as it provides attackers with the capability to fundamentally alter the application's user landscape. By successfully exploiting any of the five identified attack vectors, an attacker can add new administrators, agents, sub-agents, partners, or clients to the system without proper authorization. This capability creates a persistent threat vector that could allow attackers to establish long-term access to the system, manipulate user permissions, and potentially escalate their privileges further. The vulnerability essentially provides a backdoor mechanism for unauthorized user creation, which directly violates the principle of least privilege and undermines the application's access control mechanisms.
From a security posture perspective, this vulnerability demonstrates the critical importance of implementing comprehensive CSRF protection mechanisms across all administrative functions. The attack surface is particularly concerning because it affects multiple user types within the application, suggesting a systemic failure in the security architecture. Organizations utilizing Stark CRM 1.0 would be vulnerable to unauthorized administrative actions that could result in data breaches, privilege escalation, and potential system compromise. The vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1078 for Valid Accounts and T1566 for Phishing, as attackers could potentially use the created accounts for further malicious activities. The lack of CSRF token validation across these endpoints represents a fundamental security flaw that violates standard web application security practices.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate implementation of anti-CSRF token mechanisms across all administrative endpoints. Organizations should implement unique, cryptographically secure tokens for each user session and validate these tokens on every administrative request. The solution must be comprehensive, covering all five identified attack vectors including admin, agent, sub_agent, partner, and client management pages. Additionally, implementing proper request origin validation and utilizing secure headers such as Content Security Policy can provide additional layers of protection. Regular security assessments and input validation should be enforced to prevent similar vulnerabilities from emerging in the future, as this flaw represents a classic example of insufficient authentication validation that could be addressed through proper security architecture principles and adherence to web application security standards.