CVE-2014-4630 in BSAFE Micro Edition Suite
Summary
by MITRE
EMC RSA BSAFE Micro Edition Suite (MES) 4.0.x before 4.0.6 and RSA BSAFE SSL-J before 6.1.4 do not ensure that a server's X.509 certificate is the same during renegotiation as it was before renegotiation, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to obtain sensitive information or modify TLS session data via a "triple handshake attack."
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 03/01/2022
The vulnerability described in CVE-2014-4630 represents a critical flaw in the cryptographic security implementation of EMC RSA BSAFE Micro Edition Suite versions 4.0.x prior to 4.0.6 and RSA BSAFE SSL-J versions prior to 6.1.4. This weakness specifically targets the secure renegotiation process within TLS connections, creating a significant attack surface that adversaries can exploit to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of encrypted communications. The vulnerability stems from the software's failure to maintain certificate consistency during the renegotiation phase of TLS sessions, which violates fundamental security principles established in cryptographic protocol design standards.
The technical flaw manifests in the improper handling of X.509 certificate validation during TLS renegotiation operations. When a TLS session undergoes renegotiation, the system should verify that the server's certificate remains unchanged from the initial handshake to maintain the security guarantees established during the original connection setup. However, the affected versions of BSAFE MES and SSL-J fail to enforce this critical validation check, allowing attackers to perform what is known as a "triple handshake attack." This attack pattern enables adversaries to manipulate the certificate presented during renegotiation while maintaining the appearance of a legitimate connection, effectively bypassing the certificate validation mechanisms that are essential for establishing trust in TLS communications.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data interception, as it enables sophisticated man-in-the-middle attacks that can result in complete session hijacking and data modification. Attackers can exploit this weakness to inject malicious content into TLS sessions, modify sensitive data in transit, or even impersonate legitimate servers within the network. The vulnerability particularly affects environments where TLS renegotiation is frequently used, such as web applications, secure email systems, and enterprise communication platforms that rely on BSAFE for their cryptographic operations. This weakness can be particularly devastating in financial services, healthcare systems, and government networks where the integrity of encrypted communications is paramount.
The security implications of this vulnerability align with several key concepts from the CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) catalog, specifically CWE-310 and CWE-311, which address cryptographic weaknesses and the absence of proper cryptographic validation. From the MITRE ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to techniques involving protocol manipulation and credential access, as attackers can leverage the certificate validation bypass to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information. Organizations using affected versions of BSAFE software face a significant risk of data breaches and unauthorized access to their encrypted communications channels, making this vulnerability particularly concerning for enterprises with strict compliance requirements and security standards.
The recommended mitigation strategy involves immediate upgrading to patched versions of BSAFE MES 4.0.6 and RSA BSAFE SSL-J 6.1.4, which contain the necessary cryptographic validation fixes for TLS renegotiation. Additionally, security teams should implement monitoring for unusual renegotiation patterns and establish network segmentation to limit the potential impact of successful attacks. Organizations should also review their cryptographic implementations and ensure that all TLS connections properly validate certificate consistency throughout the session lifecycle, as outlined in industry standards such as NIST SP 800-52 and RFC 5746, which provide specific guidance on secure TLS implementation practices.