CVE-2014-5594 in Mobile Banking
Summary
by MITRE
The CIBC Mobile Banking (aka com.cibc.android.mobi) application 3.2 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/25/2024
The vulnerability described in CVE-2014-5594 represents a critical security flaw in the CIBC Mobile Banking Android application version 3.2 that fundamentally compromises the integrity of secure communications between mobile banking clients and financial servers. This weakness falls under the category of inadequate certificate validation, where the application fails to properly verify the authenticity of SSL/TLS certificates presented by servers during the secure communication establishment process. The vulnerability specifically affects the certificate verification mechanism within the application's implementation of secure socket layer protocols, creating an exploitable condition that undermines the core security assumptions of encrypted financial transactions.
The technical flaw manifests as a failure in the certificate chain validation process, where the application accepts any certificate presented by a server without performing proper verification against trusted certificate authorities. This allows attackers to perform man-in-the-middle attacks by presenting forged certificates that appear legitimate to the vulnerable application. The absence of certificate pinning or proper trust store validation means that malicious actors can intercept communications and present certificates signed by rogue certificate authorities or self-signed certificates that the application accepts without question. This vulnerability directly violates fundamental security principles of transport layer security and represents a classic example of improper certificate validation as classified under CWE-295.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and multifaceted, particularly within the financial services sector where mobile banking applications handle highly sensitive personal and financial data. Attackers exploiting this weakness could intercept and modify financial transactions, steal user credentials, access account information, and potentially redirect funds through fraudulent transfers. The vulnerability creates an attack surface that allows for passive data interception and active data manipulation, making it particularly dangerous for financial applications that require end-to-end security guarantees. The implications extend beyond simple information disclosure to encompass complete compromise of user financial accounts and potential regulatory violations under financial services compliance frameworks.
Organizations should implement comprehensive mitigation strategies that include immediate patching of the affected application, implementation of certificate pinning mechanisms, and enhanced network monitoring for suspicious certificate validation patterns. The vulnerability demonstrates the importance of proper certificate validation as outlined in the OWASP Mobile Security Project and aligns with ATT&CK technique T1041 for data manipulation and T1566 for credential access through man-in-the-middle attacks. Security teams should conduct thorough penetration testing to identify similar certificate validation flaws in other mobile applications and establish robust certificate management policies that include regular validation of trust stores and implementation of certificate transparency monitoring. Additionally, the incident highlights the necessity of following secure coding practices and adhering to mobile application security standards such as those defined in NIST SP 800-53 to prevent similar vulnerabilities in future application development cycles.