CVE-2015-7285 in DualCom GPRS CS2300-R
Summary
by MITRE
CSL DualCom GPRS CS2300-R devices with firmware 1.25 through 3.53 do not require authentication from Alarm Receiving Center (ARC) servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a spoofed HSxx response.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/10/2024
The CSL DualCom GPRS CS2300-R device represents a critical security vulnerability within the industrial alarm and monitoring systems landscape, specifically targeting the communication protocols used by Alarm Receiving Centers to interface with field devices. This vulnerability affects firmware versions ranging from 1.25 through 3.53, indicating a widespread issue across multiple iterations of the device's software implementation. The flaw resides in the authentication mechanism that governs communications between the field device and the centralized Alarm Receiving Center servers, creating an exploitable gap in the security architecture that directly impacts the integrity of alarm transmission and system monitoring operations.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from the device's failure to validate the authenticity of incoming communication from ARC servers during the HSxx response phase of the communication protocol. This authentication gap allows malicious actors to perform man-in-the-middle attacks by simply spoofing legitimate HSxx responses from authorized ARC servers. The vulnerability operates at the protocol level where the device accepts communication without proper verification of the server's identity, effectively removing any cryptographic or authentication checks that should normally validate the legitimacy of the communication source. This flaw aligns with CWE-287, which addresses improper authentication issues in network protocols, and specifically demonstrates how the absence of proper server authentication creates opportunities for attackers to manipulate system behavior through spoofed responses.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple access control breaches, as it fundamentally compromises the security posture of alarm monitoring systems that rely on these devices for critical infrastructure protection. An attacker exploiting this vulnerability can gain unauthorized access to alarm data, potentially allowing them to suppress or manipulate alarm notifications, disrupt monitoring operations, or even gain access to sensitive operational information that should remain protected. The implications are particularly severe for industrial environments where timely alarm responses are critical for safety and operational continuity. This vulnerability directly enables attackers to bypass intended access restrictions, potentially allowing them to impersonate legitimate ARC servers and control or manipulate the flow of alarm information through the network.
The attack vector for this vulnerability leverages the man-in-the-middle technique where an attacker positioned between the device and the legitimate ARC server can intercept and modify communication traffic. The attacker simply needs to respond with a spoofed HSxx message that the device will accept as legitimate, effectively allowing unauthorized access to the system. This attack pattern aligns with ATT&CK technique T1071.004, which describes protocol manipulation and the exploitation of communication protocols to gain unauthorized access. Organizations using these devices face significant risk of operational disruption, security breaches, and potential safety hazards in environments where alarm systems are critical for operational safety and emergency response.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate firmware updates from the vendor to implement proper authentication mechanisms for ARC server communications. Network segmentation and monitoring should be implemented to detect unauthorized communication patterns, while cryptographic solutions such as TLS or other secure communication protocols should be deployed to ensure server authenticity. Additionally, organizations should implement network access controls to restrict communication between field devices and ARC servers to authorized network segments only, reducing the attack surface available to potential attackers. Regular security assessments and vulnerability scanning should be conducted to identify similar authentication gaps in other networked industrial devices, as this vulnerability demonstrates how critical authentication mechanisms can be overlooked in industrial communication protocols.