CVE-2017-8865 in Dino Smart Toyinfo

Summary

by MITRE

Elemental Path's CogniToys Dino smart toys through firmware version 0.0.794 do not provide sufficient protections against capture-replay attacks, allowing an attacker on the network to replay VoIP traffic between a Dino device and remote server to any other Dino device.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 12/13/2019

The vulnerability identified as CVE-2017-8865 affects Elemental Path's CogniToys Dino smart toys running firmware versions up to 0.0.794, presenting a critical security flaw that undermines the integrity of communication between these devices and their remote servers. This issue stems from insufficient cryptographic protections within the device's VoIP implementation, creating an environment where malicious actors can intercept and subsequently replay network traffic without proper authentication or validation mechanisms.

The technical flaw resides in the device's failure to implement adequate session management and traffic authentication protocols. Specifically, the VoIP communication channel lacks proper message authentication codes or cryptographic signatures that would prevent replay attacks from succeeding. This weakness allows an attacker positioned within the same network segment to capture legitimate VoIP packets transmitted between a Dino device and Elemental Path's servers, then retransmit these packets to other Dino devices in the network. The vulnerability operates at the network level, exploiting weaknesses in the transport layer security mechanisms that should normally prevent such unauthorized traffic redirection.

From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability enables attackers to potentially manipulate multiple Dino devices within the same network without requiring physical access or complex exploitation techniques. The replay attacks could allow unauthorized users to issue commands to target devices, potentially enabling surveillance activities, device misconfiguration, or even complete device compromise. The attack vector is particularly concerning because it requires minimal technical expertise and can be executed from within the network perimeter, making it accessible to both skilled attackers and casual threat actors. This vulnerability directly violates the principles of authentication and integrity as outlined in the CWE-310 standard, which specifically addresses cryptographic weaknesses in authentication mechanisms.

The security implications extend beyond simple traffic replay, as this vulnerability creates a persistent attack surface that can be exploited repeatedly. Once an attacker successfully captures a valid VoIP session, they can reuse that information to gain unauthorized access to other devices in the network, potentially leading to a complete compromise of the smart toy ecosystem. This type of attack pattern aligns with techniques described in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the 'Tactic: Command and Control' and 'Tactic: Persistence' categories, where attackers establish covert communication channels and maintain access to compromised systems. The vulnerability also represents a failure in the principle of least privilege, as the devices lack proper session isolation mechanisms that would prevent cross-device traffic replay attacks.

Organizations and consumers should implement immediate mitigations including network segmentation to isolate smart toys from critical systems, deployment of network monitoring tools to detect anomalous VoIP traffic patterns, and firmware updates when available from Elemental Path. Additionally, network administrators should consider implementing intrusion detection systems that can identify and alert on suspicious replay attack patterns. The fundamental requirement for addressing this vulnerability involves strengthening the cryptographic protocols used in the VoIP implementation, including the adoption of proper message authentication codes, session tokens, and time-based validation mechanisms that would prevent successful replay attacks. This remediation approach aligns with industry best practices for securing IoT devices and protecting against common network-based attacks that exploit weak authentication mechanisms.

Reservation

05/09/2017

Disclosure

12/11/2017

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00832

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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