CVE-2017-8866 in Dino Smart Toy
Summary
by MITRE
Elemental Path's CogniToys Dino smart toys through firmware version 0.0.794 share a fixed small pool of hardcoded keys, allowing a remote attacker to use a different Dino device to decrypt VoIP traffic between a child's Dino and remote server.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 12/13/2019
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2017-8866 affects Elemental Path's CogniToys Dino smart toys, specifically those running firmware versions up to 0.0.794. This represents a critical security flaw in IoT devices designed for children, where the implementation of cryptographic keys demonstrates poor security practices that undermine the privacy and security of users. The affected devices are part of a broader category of connected toys that utilize VoIP communication protocols to interact with remote servers, creating a potential attack surface that extends beyond the physical device itself. The security implications are particularly concerning given the target demographic of children and the sensitive nature of communications that may occur between child users and remote servers.
The technical flaw stems from the implementation of a fixed small pool of hardcoded cryptographic keys within the device firmware. This approach violates fundamental security principles and represents a classic example of weak key management practices that fall under CWE-326 - Inadequate Encryption Strength and CWE-327 - Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm. The hardcoded keys are shared across multiple devices in the same product line, meaning that an attacker who compromises one device can potentially use the same cryptographic keys to decrypt communications from other devices in the network. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to perform man-in-the-middle attacks on the VoIP traffic between the child's Dino device and the remote server, effectively breaking the encryption that should protect communications between the toy and the cloud infrastructure.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data interception, as it creates a persistent security risk that can be exploited by attackers without requiring physical access to the device. Attackers can leverage this weakness to monitor and potentially manipulate communications between the child and the remote server, which could include voice conversations, educational content delivery, or other interactive features. The attack surface is further expanded by the fact that multiple devices share the same key pool, meaning a single compromise can provide access to numerous connected devices. This vulnerability also aligns with ATT&CK technique T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, as it enables attackers to exfiltrate data from connected devices through the established communication channels. The risk is particularly elevated because the devices are designed for children, making them attractive targets for attackers seeking to exploit the privacy concerns associated with children's data.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must address both immediate remediation and long-term security improvements in the device architecture. The most effective immediate solution involves updating the firmware to implement properly generated and unique cryptographic keys for each device, eliminating the shared key pool that enables the attack. Device manufacturers should implement secure key generation mechanisms and proper key distribution protocols that align with industry standards such as NIST SP 800-57 for cryptographic key management. Organizations should also consider network segmentation and monitoring to detect anomalous communication patterns that might indicate exploitation attempts. The vulnerability highlights the need for comprehensive security testing of IoT devices before deployment, particularly focusing on cryptographic implementations and key management practices. Additionally, implementing device authentication mechanisms and secure communication protocols would provide defense-in-depth measures that could protect against similar vulnerabilities in future deployments. Regular security audits and penetration testing of IoT ecosystems should be conducted to identify and remediate similar weaknesses in connected device implementations.