CVE-2018-10192 in IPVanish
Summary
by MITRE
IPVanish 3.0.11 for macOS suffers from a root privilege escalation vulnerability. The `com.ipvanish.osx.vpnhelper` LaunchDaemon implements an insecure XPC service that could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code as the root user. IPVanish uses a third-party library for converting `xpc_object_t` types in to `NSObject` types for sending XPC messages. When IPVanish establishes a new connection, the following XPC message is sent to the `com.ipvanish.osx.vpnhelper` LaunchDaemon. Because the XPC service itself does not validate an incoming connection, any application installed on the operating system can send it XPC messages. In the case of the "connect" message, an attacker could manipulate the `OpenVPNPath` to point at a malicious binary on the system. The `com.ipvanish.osx.vpnhelper` would receive the VPNHelperConnect command, and then execute the malicious binary as the root user.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/25/2020
The vulnerability described in CVE-2018-10192 represents a critical privilege escalation flaw within IPVanish version 3.0.11 for macOS operating systems. This security weakness stems from improper implementation of an XPC (Cross-Process Communication) service that operates with elevated privileges through a LaunchDaemon. The affected service named com.ipvanish.osx.vpnhelper creates an attack surface that allows any local application to interact with the privileged helper tool, fundamentally undermining the security model of macOS application sandboxing and privilege separation mechanisms. The vulnerability specifically manifests in the insecure handling of XPC messages within the VPN helper daemon, which processes connection requests without proper authentication or message validation checks.
The technical flaw occurs within the XPC service architecture where IPVanish utilizes a third-party library to convert xpc_object_t types into NSObject types for message handling. This conversion process introduces a critical security gap because the XPC service lacks proper validation of incoming connection parameters. When establishing a VPN connection, the service receives XPC messages containing an OpenVPNPath parameter that specifies which binary to execute. The absence of input validation and parameter sanitization allows attackers to manipulate this path variable to point toward malicious executables located anywhere on the filesystem. The LaunchDaemon executes these binaries with root privileges, effectively granting attackers complete system control without requiring any user interaction or authentication.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple privilege escalation to encompass complete system compromise. Attackers can leverage this flaw to execute arbitrary code with root privileges, potentially installing persistent backdoors, modifying system files, or exfiltrating sensitive data. The attack vector requires no special privileges or user interaction since any application on the system can communicate with the vulnerable XPC service. This makes the vulnerability particularly dangerous in environments where users may inadvertently install malicious software or where attackers can exploit other vulnerabilities to gain initial access. The privilege escalation occurs silently without user awareness, making detection and mitigation particularly challenging for security administrators.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on immediate patching of the affected IPVanish software to version 3.0.12 or later, which contains the necessary security fixes for the XPC service implementation. System administrators should also implement monitoring of XPC communication patterns and verify that the com.ipvanish.osx.vpnhelper LaunchDaemon properly validates all incoming XPC messages before processing them. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) and CWE-78 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in OS Command Execution) categories, representing a classic case of insufficient input validation combined with privilege escalation. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation) and T1543.003 (Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon), demonstrating how insecure service implementations can be exploited to establish persistent system-level access. Organizations should also consider implementing application control policies to restrict communication with potentially vulnerable helper tools and ensure that only trusted applications can interact with privileged system services.