CVE-2026-58442 in Gitea
Summary
by MITRE • 08/13/2026
Repository migration SSRF via multi-answer DNS allow-list bypass
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/13/2026
Server-side request forgery vulnerabilities in repository migration workflows represent critical security risks that can enable attackers to bypass restrictive network controls and access internal systems. This specific vulnerability occurs when a system employs a multi-answer DNS allow-list mechanism to validate external requests during repository migration operations, but fails to properly validate all DNS response answers. The flaw allows malicious actors to manipulate the DNS resolution process by providing multiple A record responses where one answer points to an allowed internal IP address while others contain attacker-controlled destinations.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from improper DNS validation logic that accepts any valid DNS response from the allow-listed domain without thoroughly inspecting all returned answers. When a repository migration process performs DNS lookups against a domain that returns multiple A records, the system may only validate the first or primary answer while ignoring subsequent responses that could contain malicious IP addresses. This behavior creates an attack surface where an attacker can control the DNS response to include both legitimate and malicious answers, with the system accepting the allow-listed portion while inadvertently processing the malicious components.
Operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple network access bypasses as it enables comprehensive internal reconnaissance and lateral movement within organizational networks. Attackers can leverage this weakness to target internal services that are normally protected by firewalls or network segmentation, including database servers, administrative interfaces, and internal APIs that would otherwise remain inaccessible from external networks. The vulnerability particularly affects CI/CD pipelines and automated migration systems where repository operations often require external connectivity and DNS resolution for service discovery and configuration.
Security controls should include comprehensive DNS response validation that examines all returned answers rather than just the first or primary response, implementation of strict DNS resolution policies that reject multi-answer responses for critical operations, and regular monitoring of DNS queries to detect anomalous patterns. Organizations must also consider implementing network segmentation and micro-segmentation to limit the potential impact even if such vulnerabilities are exploited. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery and maps to ATT&CK technique T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol DNS, where attackers exploit DNS resolution mechanisms to bypass network controls and gain access to internal resources.
Mitigation strategies should focus on implementing strict validation of DNS responses including thorough inspection of all returned answers, deployment of DNS filtering solutions that can detect and block suspicious multi-answer responses, and establishing proper security controls around automated systems that perform external connectivity operations. Organizations should also implement network monitoring and logging capabilities specifically designed to detect anomalous DNS behavior patterns that could indicate exploitation attempts. The solution requires careful attention to how DNS resolution is handled in automated workflows and should include comprehensive testing of DNS validation logic under various attack scenarios to ensure proper protection against similar vulnerabilities.