CVE-2018-19443 in Tryton
Summary
by MITRE
The client in Tryton 5.x before 5.0.1 tries to make a connection to the bus in cleartext instead of encrypted under certain circumstances in bus.py and jsonrpc.py. This connection attempt fails, but it contains in the header the current session of the user. This session could then be stolen by a man-in-the-middle.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 04/14/2020
The vulnerability described in CVE-2018-19443 affects Tryton 5.x versions prior to 5.0.1 and represents a significant security flaw in the application's communication protocols. This issue manifests in the client-side components of Tryton where the system attempts to establish connections to the bus service using cleartext transmission rather than encrypted channels under specific operational conditions. The vulnerability exists within the bus.py and jsonrpc.py files, which are critical components responsible for handling real-time communication and remote procedure calls within the Tryton framework. The flaw occurs when the system fails to properly negotiate secure communication channels, defaulting to insecure connections despite the availability of encryption options.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from improper handling of secure communication protocols within the Tryton client architecture. When the client attempts to connect to the bus service, it initially tries to establish a cleartext connection before falling back to encrypted channels. During this connection attempt, the system includes the current user session identifier in the HTTP headers of the request. This session token contains sensitive authentication information that allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the user's session. The vulnerability specifically relates to CWE-319, which addresses the exposure of sensitive information through cleartext transmission, and also connects to CWE-306, which deals with missing authentication in secure communication channels. The flaw essentially creates a window of opportunity where session tokens are transmitted in an unencrypted format, making them susceptible to interception by malicious actors monitoring network traffic.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is substantial as it enables man-in-the-middle attacks that can lead to full session hijacking and unauthorized access to Tryton applications. An attacker positioned between the client and server can capture the session token from the cleartext headers and use it to impersonate the legitimate user, potentially gaining access to sensitive data, performing unauthorized transactions, and executing administrative functions within the Tryton system. This risk is particularly severe in environments where network traffic is not properly secured or where users operate in untrusted network environments such as public Wi-Fi networks. The vulnerability affects all users of Tryton 5.x versions before 5.0.1 and can be exploited regardless of the specific business processes being executed within the application, making it a critical concern for organizations relying on Tryton for their business operations.
The remediation approach for this vulnerability requires immediate upgrading to Tryton version 5.0.1 or later where the issue has been addressed through proper implementation of secure communication protocols. Organizations should ensure that all client systems are updated to prevent the cleartext connection attempts that expose session tokens. Additionally, network administrators should implement proper traffic monitoring and encryption enforcement measures to detect and prevent similar vulnerabilities in other applications. The fix implemented in the patched versions ensures that secure connections are properly negotiated and that session information is not transmitted in cleartext headers, aligning with the ATT&CK technique T1046 which involves the use of network service scanning to identify vulnerable systems. Security teams should also consider implementing additional monitoring for unusual connection patterns and session token usage to detect potential exploitation attempts. Organizations should review their overall security posture and ensure that all communication channels within their Tryton deployments are properly encrypted using TLS protocols to prevent similar issues from occurring in the future.