CVE-2018-8013 in Rapid Planning
Summary
by MITRE
In Apache Batik 1.x before 1.10, when deserializing subclass of `AbstractDocument`, the class takes a string from the inputStream as the class name which then use it to call the no-arg constructor of the class. Fix was to check the class type before calling newInstance in deserialization.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/16/2024
Apache Batik version 1.x prior to 1.10 contained a critical deserialization vulnerability that exposed systems to remote code execution through improper input validation during object reconstruction. The flaw existed within the deserialization process of AbstractDocument subclasses where the system accepted arbitrary class names from input streams without adequate type verification. This vulnerability directly maps to CWE-502 which categorizes insecure deserialization as a significant security risk. When malicious input was processed, the system would extract a class name string from the inputStream and subsequently invoke the no-arg constructor of that specified class through reflection mechanisms.
The technical exploitation of this vulnerability occurred through crafted serialized data that could manipulate the deserialization flow to instantiate arbitrary classes within the application's classpath. Attackers could leverage this weakness to execute arbitrary code on the target system by specifying classes that would perform malicious operations during instantiation. This represents a classic deserialization attack vector that aligns with ATT&CK technique T1203, which involves using malicious serialized objects to execute code on target systems. The vulnerability was particularly dangerous because it allowed attackers to bypass normal access controls and execute code with the privileges of the running application.
The operational impact of CVE-2018-8013 was severe for organizations using affected Apache Batik versions, as it provided a straightforward path to remote code execution without requiring authentication. Systems processing untrusted serialized data through Batik's deserialization mechanisms became immediately vulnerable to exploitation. The vulnerability affected web applications and services that utilized Batik for SVG processing, making it a significant concern for any system that handled potentially malicious SVG files or data streams. Organizations running vulnerable versions faced the risk of complete system compromise, data exfiltration, and service disruption.
The fix implemented by Apache addressed the core issue by introducing proper class type validation before attempting to instantiate objects during deserialization. This mitigation strategy aligns with security best practices for preventing deserialization attacks by ensuring that only known, safe classes can be instantiated. The solution required checking the class type against a whitelist of acceptable classes before calling newInstance, effectively preventing attackers from specifying arbitrary class names. This approach follows the principle of least privilege and input validation, which are fundamental security controls recommended in both NIST SP 800-53 and OWASP Top Ten security frameworks. Organizations should immediately upgrade to Apache Batik 1.10 or later versions to remediate this vulnerability and protect against potential exploitation attempts.