CVE-2019-11642 in Policy Framework
Summary
by MITRE
A log poisoning vulnerability has been discovered in the OneShield Policy (Dragon Core) framework before 5.1.10. Authenticated remote adversaries can poison log files by entering malicious payloads in either headers or form elements. These payloads are then executed via a client side debugging console. This is predicated on the debugging console and Java Bean being made available to the deployed application.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/15/2023
The log poisoning vulnerability identified as CVE-2019-11642 affects the OneShield Policy Dragon Core framework version 5.1.9 and earlier, representing a critical security flaw that enables authenticated remote attackers to manipulate application logs through carefully crafted malicious inputs. This vulnerability stems from insufficient input validation and sanitization mechanisms within the framework's logging infrastructure, allowing attackers to inject malicious payloads that persist in log files and subsequently execute within the client-side debugging console environment.
The technical exploitation of this vulnerability occurs through multiple attack vectors including HTTP headers and form elements, where malicious payloads can be injected by authenticated users who possess legitimate access to the application. When these payloads are processed and logged by the framework, they become persistent within the application's logging system, creating a condition where the debugging console can execute arbitrary code or commands. The vulnerability specifically requires that both the debugging console and Java Bean components remain accessible within the deployed application environment, as these elements serve as the execution context for the malicious payloads contained within the poisoned log files.
This vulnerability has significant operational impact as it can enable attackers to escalate privileges and gain deeper access to the application infrastructure. The log poisoning mechanism creates a persistent backdoor through which attackers can maintain access even after initial exploitation, as the malicious payloads remain embedded in the log files and can be triggered repeatedly. The vulnerability also undermines the integrity of the application's logging system, which is crucial for security monitoring, incident response, and forensic analysis. Organizations relying on these logs for security operations may find their monitoring systems compromised, leading to potential undetected persistence and data exfiltration activities.
The exploitation of CVE-2019-11642 aligns with several ATT&CK techniques including T1070.004 (Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion) through log manipulation, T1059.007 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python) when payloads execute within the debugging console, and T1566.001 (Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment) through the delivery mechanism of malicious payloads via form elements and headers. From a CWE perspective, this vulnerability maps to CWE-117 (Improper Output Neutralization for Logs) and CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code) as it demonstrates inadequate sanitization of user inputs before logging and the execution of malicious code through legitimate debugging interfaces. The vulnerability also relates to CWE-79 (Cross-site Scripting) and CWE-89 (SQL Injection) through the potential for payload execution in client-side contexts and database interactions.
Organizations should implement comprehensive mitigations including immediate patching to version 5.1.10 or later, disabling unnecessary debugging consoles in production environments, implementing strict input validation and sanitization protocols for all user-supplied data, and establishing robust log file monitoring and integrity checking mechanisms. Network segmentation and access control measures should be strengthened to limit the scope of authenticated access that could potentially exploit this vulnerability. Additionally, security teams should conduct thorough log file reviews to identify any potential exploitation attempts and implement automated alerting for suspicious log patterns that may indicate malicious activity. The remediation process should include comprehensive security testing of all application components that interact with logging systems to ensure that similar vulnerabilities are not present in other parts of the application architecture.