CVE-2026-79755 in Nuclio
Summary
by MITRE • 09/02/2026
Nuclio is a "Serverless" framework for Real-Time Events and Data Processing. Prior to version 1.17.4, on the Nuclio local Docker platform, the function namespace is interpolated—unvalidated—into a double-quoted docker ps --filter "label=nuclio.io/namespace=<value>" command that is executed via the host shell (/bin/sh -c). Because the default auth kind is nop (unauthenticated), a remote attacker can inject arbitrary OS commands that run as root inside the dashboard container, which holds the Docker socket → host compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.17.4.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/02/2026
Nuclio operates as a serverless framework designed for real-time event and data processing, facilitating the deployment of functions that react to various triggers such as HTTP requests or stream events. Within its local Docker platform architecture, the system manages function namespaces by constructing shell commands to query running containers via the docker CLI tool. Specifically, when listing containers associated with a specific namespace, Nuclio constructs a command string using double-quoted arguments for the docker ps --filter parameter. Prior to version 1.17.4, this construction process failed to properly validate or sanitize the namespace input before interpolation into the shell command string. This architectural flaw creates a classic Command Injection vulnerability where user-supplied data is executed directly by the operating system's command interpreter without adequate restrictions on special characters or escape sequences.
The technical severity of this flaw is significantly amplified by Nuclio's default configuration settings. By default, the authentication kind is set to nop, which means no authentication mechanism is enforced for accessing the dashboard and its associated APIs. Consequently, any remote attacker with network access to the Nuclui dashboard can interact with these endpoints without providing credentials. When an attacker submits a specially crafted namespace string containing shell metacharacters such as semicolons or pipe symbols, these characters are passed through to the /bin/sh -c execution context. Because the docker command is executed within the dashboard container which typically mounts the host's Docker socket for management purposes, any commands injected via this vector run with root privileges inside that container and effectively have unrestricted access to the underlying host system.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple data exfiltration or service disruption. An attacker can achieve full remote code execution on the host machine by leveraging the elevated permissions granted through the Docker socket mount. This allows for complete compromise of the infrastructure, including the ability to spin up malicious containers, access sensitive volumes mounted in other containers, modify system configurations, and establish persistent backdoors. The lack of authentication serves as a critical enabling factor, transforming what might otherwise be an internal or authenticated-only risk into a trivially exploitable remote vulnerability accessible from any network location that can reach the dashboard service. This aligns with CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command and is categorized under ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, specifically reflecting lateral movement or privilege escalation vectors enabled by container escape mechanisms.
To mitigate this risk, organizations running Nuclio must immediately upgrade to version 1.17.4 or later where the input validation for namespace interpolation has been corrected. In environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, it is imperative to enforce strict authentication on the dashboard interface to prevent unauthenticated access. Additionally, administrators should review Docker socket permissions and consider running the Nuclio dashboard in a restricted network segment with minimal privileges, ensuring that even if an injection occurs, the blast radius of host compromise is contained through proper container isolation policies and least-privilege principles applied at both the Kubernetes or Docker level.