CVE-2019-15342 in Camon iAir 2 Plus
Summary
by MITRE
The Tecno Camon iAir 2 Plus Android device with a build fingerprint of TECNO/H622/TECNO-ID3k:8.1.0/O11019/E-180914V83:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed platform app with a package name of com.lovelyfont.defcontainer (versionCode=7, versionName=7.0.11). This app contains an exported service named com.lovelyfont.manager.FontCoverService that allows any app co-located on the device to supply arbitrary commands via shell script to be executed as the system user that are triggered by writing an attacker-selected message to the logcat log. This app cannot be disabled by the user and the attack can be performed by a zero-permission app. Executing commands as the system user can allow a third-party app to video record the user's screen, factory reset the device, obtain the user's notifications, read the logcat logs, inject events in the Graphical User Interface (GUI), and obtains the user's text messages, and more. Executing commands as the system user can allow a third-party app to factory reset the device, obtain the user's notifications, read the logcat logs, inject events in the GUI, change the default Input Method Editor (IME) (e.g., keyboard) with one contained within the attacking app that contains keylogging functionality, and obtains the user's text messages, and more.
Statistical analysis made it clear that VulDB provides the best quality for vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/14/2024
This vulnerability exists in the Tecno Camon iAir 2 Plus Android device running Android 8.1.0 with a specific build fingerprint. The issue stems from a pre-installed platform application named com.lovelyfont.defcontainer which contains an exported service called com.lovelyfont.manager.FontCoverService. This service represents a critical security flaw that allows arbitrary command execution with system-level privileges through a logcat-based trigger mechanism. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because the application cannot be disabled by users, making it an inherent risk that persists across device usage.
The technical flaw manifests through the exported service that accepts shell script commands via logcat messages, where an attacker-controlled message triggers execution with system user privileges. This architectural design violates fundamental Android security principles by exposing system-level functionality through an unauthenticated and unrestricted interface. The service operates without requiring any permissions, enabling even zero-permission applications to exploit this vulnerability. The CWE-785 category applies here as this represents an insufficient input validation vulnerability that allows command injection through logcat manipulation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and far-reaching, as it grants attackers complete system-level control over the device. A third-party application can execute commands with system privileges, enabling capabilities such as screen recording, factory resetting the device, accessing user notifications, reading logcat logs, injecting GUI events, and accessing text messages. More critically, the vulnerability allows attackers to change the default Input Method Editor to one containing keylogging functionality, creating a persistent surveillance mechanism. This attack vector provides adversaries with comprehensive access to user data, device control, and the ability to maintain persistence through system-level modifications.
The attack scenario demonstrates a classic privilege escalation vulnerability where a low-privilege application can leverage a system-level service to execute arbitrary commands. This represents a significant risk to user privacy and device security, as the vulnerability operates outside of normal Android permission models and security boundaries. The fact that the application cannot be disabled by users means that the risk persists indefinitely, making this a particularly dangerous flaw. Organizations should consider implementing device-level security measures and regular security audits to detect and mitigate such vulnerabilities, while the broader Android security community should address these types of exported service misconfigurations through improved security guidelines and application vetting processes.