CVE-2020-28333 in wePresent WiPG-1600W
Summary
by MITRE • 11/25/2020
Barco wePresent WiPG-1600W devices allow Authentication Bypass. Affected Version(s): 2.5.1.8. The Barco wePresent WiPG-1600W web interface does not use session cookies for tracking authenticated sessions. Instead, the web interface uses a "SEID" token that is appended to the end of URLs in GET requests. Thus the "SEID" would be exposed in web proxy logs and browser history. An attacker that is able to capture the "SEID" and originate requests from the same IP address (via a NAT device or web proxy) would be able to access the user interface of the device without having to know the credentials.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 12/09/2020
The Barco wePresent WiPG-1600W device represents a critical authentication bypass vulnerability that fundamentally undermines the security posture of networked presentation equipment. This vulnerability affects version 2.5.1.8 of the device firmware and exposes a fundamental flaw in the web interface's session management architecture. The device's implementation of authentication tracking through a static SEID token appended to URLs violates established security best practices for session management and creates a persistent attack vector that can be exploited by adversaries with relatively simple network reconnaissance capabilities.
The technical flaw lies in the device's reliance on URL-based session tracking rather than secure cookie-based session management. When users authenticate to the web interface, the system generates a SEID token that becomes permanently embedded in the URL structure of every subsequent request. This design choice directly contravenes the principles outlined in CWE-384, which specifically addresses the vulnerability of session management systems that use predictable or exposed identifiers. The SEID token's exposure through web proxy logs, browser history, and network traffic creates an attack surface that allows unauthorized access to the device's administrative interface without credential compromise.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple unauthorized access to encompass potential full device compromise and network infiltration. An attacker who captures a single SEID token can maintain persistent access to the device's web interface as long as they can originate requests from the same IP address range, typically through network address translation or proxy configurations. This scenario aligns with ATT&CK technique T1078.004, which covers legitimate credentials used for persistence, as the attacker essentially gains the same level of access as an authenticated user. The vulnerability particularly affects environments where multiple users share network infrastructure, as the NAT device or web proxy creates a shared IP address pool that can be exploited by any attacker who obtains a valid SEID token.
The security implications of this vulnerability are compounded by the nature of presentation equipment in enterprise environments. These devices often serve as central points of network access for meetings, presentations, and collaborative sessions, making them attractive targets for attackers seeking to establish persistent access to corporate networks. The exposure of session tokens through URL parameters creates a persistent threat that can be exploited across multiple sessions and user accounts, potentially allowing attackers to monitor network traffic, modify device configurations, or use the device as a pivot point for further network exploration. The vulnerability also creates challenges for network monitoring and incident response teams, as the presence of these tokens in logs and history makes detection more difficult.
Mitigation strategies should focus on immediate firmware updates from Barco to address the session management flaw, while network administrators should implement strict access controls and monitoring for web interface traffic. The solution requires addressing the root cause through proper session management implementation that utilizes secure, randomly generated session identifiers stored in HTTP-only cookies rather than URL parameters. Organizations should also consider network segmentation to limit access to these devices and implement additional authentication layers for critical administrative functions. The vulnerability serves as a reminder of the importance of proper session management in embedded systems and the critical need for security by design principles in networked devices.