CVE-2026-82648 in AVideo
Summary
by MITRE • 08/30/2026
WWBN AVideo contains a server-side request forgery filter bypass vulnerability in the isSSRFSafeURL function that fails to normalize NAT64 addresses written in hexadecimal form. Attackers can bypass SSRF protections by supplying hex-encoded NAT64 addresses like 64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe to reach cloud metadata services and loopback interfaces.
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/30/2026
The vulnerability identified in WWBN AVideo stems from a critical flaw within the isSSRFSafeURL function, which serves as the primary defense mechanism against Server-Side Request Forgery attacks. This component is designed to validate URLs provided by users before they are processed by the server, ensuring that requests do not target internal or restricted network resources. However, the implementation fails to adequately normalize and inspect addresses formatted in hexadecimal notation specifically for NAT64 (Network Address Translation from IPv6 to IPv4) structures. By neglecting to parse these hex-encoded representations correctly, the validation logic allows maliciously crafted inputs to slip through the security filter undetected. This oversight represents a classic input validation failure where the application assumes standard decimal or dotted-quad notation for IP addresses without accounting for alternative encoding methods that can represent the same logical endpoints in a different textual format.
From an operational perspective, this flaw enables attackers to bypass SSRF protections and initiate requests to internal services that are typically isolated from external access. Specifically, adversaries can leverage hex-encoded NAT64 addresses such as 64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe to target cloud metadata endpoints like those found in AWS or Azure, which often contain sensitive authentication credentials and configuration data. Additionally, the vulnerability allows direct communication with loopback interfaces on the host machine, potentially exposing internal applications running on localhost ports that are not exposed to the public internet. This capability transforms a standard web application into an effective proxy for attacking other systems within the same network segment or cloud environment, significantly expanding the attack surface beyond what was originally intended by the software architecture.
The security implications of this vulnerability align closely with CWE-918, which describes Server-Side Request Forgery flaws where server-side code makes requests to user-supplied URLs without proper validation. Furthermore, the exploitation technique maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK tactic T1059 and subtechnique T1059.004 regarding Command and Scripting Interpreter usage for lateral movement or data exfiltration via SSRF. The ability to reach cloud metadata services is particularly severe as it can lead to full account compromise if the instance has attached IAM roles with excessive permissions. Similarly, accessing loopback interfaces may allow attackers to interact with internal databases, administrative panels, or other microservices that rely on localhost-only access controls for security, effectively rendering those network-level protections useless against this specific bypass technique.
To mitigate this risk, developers must implement robust input normalization and validation strategies within the isSSRFSafeURL function. This includes parsing all IP address formats, including IPv6 hex notation and NAT64 translations, into a canonical binary representation before performing security checks. The application should resolve these addresses to their final destination IPs and verify that they do not fall within reserved ranges such as private networks (10.x.x.x, 192.168.x.x), loopback (127.0.0.1/::1), or cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254). Additionally, implementing a strict allowlist of permitted destination domains and IPs is recommended over relying solely on blacklist-based filtering. Regular security audits focusing on URL parsing libraries and network request handling logic are essential to prevent similar bypasses in the future.