CVE-2021-44320 in AR.Drone
Summary
by MITRE • 09/04/2026
Parrot AR.Drone version 1 and 2 does not employ a suitable mechanism to prevent denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. An attacker can harm the device availability (i.e., video streaming and control) by using tool to perform an IPv4 flood attack. Verified attacks includes SYN flooding and UDP flooding.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/04/2026
The Parrot AR.Drone, encompassing both version 1 and version 2 of its firmware architecture, exhibits a critical architectural deficiency in its network stack implementation regarding the handling of incoming Internet Protocol Version 4 traffic. This vulnerability stems from an absence of robust rate-limiting mechanisms or stateful inspection capabilities designed to mitigate volumetric attacks at the application layer interface that communicates with the drone's control and video streaming subsystems. Consequently, the device lacks a suitable mechanism to prevent denial-of-service conditions when subjected to high-volume network traffic, leaving it vulnerable to resource exhaustion attacks that can severely degrade operational performance or cause complete service unavailability.
From a technical perspective, the flaw allows an attacker within local network range or potentially over extended ranges if relayed through compromised infrastructure to execute IPv4 flood attacks against the drone's communication ports. Verified attack vectors include SYN flooding and UDP flooding techniques. In a SYN flood scenario, the attacker sends a rapid succession of TCP synchronization packets with spoofed source addresses, causing the drone’s operating system to allocate resources for half-open connections until it exhausts its available memory or connection table entries. Similarly, UDP floods involve sending large volumes of User Datagram Protocol packets to random ports on the target device, forcing the OS to process these datagrams and respond with unreachable port messages if no service is listening there, thereby consuming CPU cycles and network bandwidth intended for legitimate control signals and video data transmission.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant given the real-time nature of drone operations. The primary consequence is a denial of availability for both critical functions: live video streaming and remote vehicle control. When under attack, the latency in receiving commands increases dramatically or packets are dropped entirely due to buffer overflows caused by the flood traffic. This results in the operator losing situational awareness through the video feed and potentially causing the drone to become uncontrollable, which can lead to physical crashes if the device is airborne during the onset of the attack. For applications involving surveillance, inspection, or recreational flight where stable connectivity is paramount, this flaw represents a severe risk to mission success and hardware integrity.
This vulnerability aligns with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers such as CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption, which describes scenarios where an entity does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of limited resources, leading to resource exhaustion. Furthermore, in the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this behavior is characteristic of T1498: Network Denial of Service, specifically under sub-techniques like T1498.002: Reflection Amplification or direct volumetric flooding attacks that aim to saturate network bandwidth or overwhelm host resources. The lack of input validation and traffic shaping at the drone’s network interface is a fundamental design oversight in embedded systems where computational power is often constrained compared to standard servers, making them disproportionately susceptible to such floods relative to their processing capabilities.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must focus on both immediate operational countermeasures and long-term architectural improvements. Operators should restrict access to the drone's control network by implementing firewall rules that limit incoming traffic rates or block known malicious IP ranges if operating in a controlled environment. Network segmentation is also advisable, ensuring the drone operates on a isolated VLAN separate from general corporate or home networks to prevent lateral movement and reduce exposure to broader internet-based floods. For developers and manufacturers, the primary remediation involves implementing rate-limiting algorithms at the network interface level to drop excessive SYN requests or UDP packets that exceed defined thresholds. Additionally, integrating stateful packet inspection can help identify and discard malformed or spoofed packets before they consume system resources. Firmware updates should prioritize hardening the TCP/IP stack against resource exhaustion attacks by optimizing connection handling timeouts and ensuring efficient memory management during high-load scenarios.