CVE-2026-86187 in AVideo
Summary
by MITRE • 09/05/2026
WWBN AVideo generates passwords for external-login accounts using rand() instead of a cryptographic generator, producing only 31-bit integers. Attackers with access to password hashes can recover plaintext passwords in minutes through offline brute-force attacks due to unsalted MD5-based hashing.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/05/2026
The vulnerability identified in WWBN AVideo stems from fundamental flaws in the application's authentication and credential storage mechanisms, specifically regarding how external-login account passwords are generated and hashed. The core issue lies in the use of the standard C library function rand() for password generation rather than a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator such as /dev/urandom or OpenSSL RAND_bytes. This implementation error results in the production of only 31-bit integers, which drastically reduces the entropy available to an attacker attempting to guess or brute-force passwords. In cryptographic terms, a 31-bit key space offers approximately two billion possible combinations, a magnitude that is trivially small for modern computing hardware capable of performing billions of hash computations per second. This weakness effectively neutralizes any intended complexity in password selection by users who rely on the system's default generation methods or when weak user-chosen passwords are used within this constrained mathematical context.
Compounding the issue with insecure random number generation is the method employed for storing these credentials. The application utilizes unsalted MD5 hashing to protect stored password hashes. MD5 is a deprecated cryptographic hash function known to be vulnerable to collision attacks and, more critically in this context, highly susceptible to pre-computed rainbow table attacks and rapid brute-forcing due to its speed of computation on modern CPUs and GPUs. The absence of salt means that identical passwords result in identical hashes across all users, allowing attackers to crack multiple accounts simultaneously with a single computational effort. Furthermore, because MD5 is not designed for password storage where high resistance to guessing is required, the combination of unsalted hashing and weak entropy creates a critical security failure. An attacker who gains access to the database or file system containing these hashes can initiate offline brute-force attacks that are both efficient and effective, requiring minimal resources to recover plaintext passwords from the stored values.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe for any deployment of WWBN AVideo where external-login accounts are utilized. Since password recovery can be achieved in minutes by an adversary with read access to the hash storage, confidentiality of user credentials is completely compromised. This breach allows unauthorized actors to assume the identity of legitimate users, potentially leading to data exfiltration, modification of video content, or further lateral movement within a network if these accounts have elevated privileges. The risk extends beyond individual account compromise; it undermines trust in the platform's security posture and exposes organizations to regulatory non-compliance regarding data protection standards that mandate strong cryptographic practices for credential management.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation steps must focus on strengthening both password generation and storage algorithms. Developers should replace rand() with a cryptographically secure random number generator that produces high-entropy output suitable for creating robust passwords or session tokens. For password hashing, the application must migrate from MD5 to an adaptive hash function designed specifically for password storage, such as bcrypt, scrypt, Argon2id, or PBKDF2. These algorithms incorporate salt automatically and are computationally expensive by design, significantly increasing the time required for brute-force attacks. Additionally, implementing rate limiting on login attempts can provide a layer of defense against online guessing attacks, although this does not replace the need for secure offline hashing practices. Regular security audits and code reviews focusing on cryptographic implementations are essential to prevent similar flaws in future updates or custom integrations.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-330, which describes the use of insufficiently random values, and CWE-757, concerning the selection of a cryptographic algorithm that is not proven secure. In terms of offensive security frameworks, this flaw facilitates ATT&CK technique T1110, specifically brute force sub-techniques like T1110.003 for password spraying or offline credential guessing. Addressing these issues requires a holistic approach to application security that prioritizes cryptographic best practices over convenience or legacy compatibility.