CVE-2024-23949 in libigl
Summary
by MITRE • 05/28/2024
Multiple improper array index validation vulnerabilities exist in the readMSH functionality of libigl v2.5.0. A specially crafted .msh file can lead to an out-of-bounds write. An attacker can provide a malicious file to trigger this vulnerability.This vulnerability concerns the `igl::MshLoader::parse_node_field` function while handling an `ascii`.msh` file.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 03/27/2025
The vulnerability CVE-2024-23949 represents a critical improper array index validation flaw within the libigl library version 2.5.0, specifically affecting the readMSH functionality. This issue manifests in the `igl::MshLoader::parse_node_field` function when processing ascii .msh files, creating a significant security risk that can be exploited through crafted malicious input. The vulnerability stems from inadequate bounds checking during array access operations, allowing attackers to manipulate memory layout through carefully constructed input files.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability involves the failure to properly validate array indices when parsing mesh files, particularly in the context of node field data processing. When the MshLoader attempts to parse node fields from an ascii .msh file, it does not sufficiently validate the array boundaries before performing write operations. This creates an out-of-bounds write condition that can be triggered by providing a maliciously crafted .msh file containing malformed index values. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-129 as "Improper Validation of Array Index" and represents a direct violation of proper input sanitization practices.
Operationally, this vulnerability presents a severe risk to systems utilizing libigl for mesh processing, particularly in applications handling untrusted mesh data such as 3D modeling software, CAD applications, or computational geometry tools. An attacker could exploit this flaw by preparing a specially crafted .msh file that contains invalid array indices, leading to memory corruption that could result in arbitrary code execution, denial of service, or information disclosure. The impact extends to any software that relies on libigl's MSH file parsing capabilities, making it a widespread concern across various domains including scientific computing, engineering applications, and 3D graphics processing systems.
The exploitation of this vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1203 "Exploitation for Client Execution" and T1059 "Command and Scripting Interpreter" as attackers could leverage the out-of-bounds write to execute malicious code within the target environment. The vulnerability's accessibility through file-based input makes it particularly dangerous in scenarios where users might inadvertently open malicious mesh files or when the library is used in automated processing pipelines. Mitigation strategies should focus on immediate patching of libigl to version 2.5.1 or later, implementing strict input validation for mesh file parsing, and employing sandboxing techniques to isolate mesh processing operations. Additionally, organizations should conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessments to identify any applications using affected versions of libigl and establish robust input sanitization protocols for all mesh file processing activities.
The broader implications of this vulnerability highlight the critical importance of proper array bounds checking in C/C++ applications, particularly in libraries handling binary or structured data formats. The flaw demonstrates how seemingly minor validation issues can lead to severe security consequences, emphasizing the need for comprehensive security testing and code review processes in open-source libraries that handle user-provided data. Security teams should prioritize monitoring for similar vulnerabilities in related mesh processing libraries and maintain updated threat intelligence regarding potential exploitation techniques targeting scientific computing software stacks.