CVE-2024-31457 in gin-vue-admin
Summary
by MITRE • 04/09/2024
gin-vue-admin is a backstage management system based on vue and gin, which separates the front and rear of the full stack. gin-vue-admin pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240407133540-7bc7c3051067, corresponding to version 2.6.1, has a code injection vulnerability in the backend. In the Plugin System -> Plugin Template feature, an attacker can perform directory traversal by manipulating the `plugName` parameter. They can create specific folders such as `api`, `config`, `global`, `model`, `router`, `service`, and `main.go` function within the specified traversal directory. Moreover, the Go files within these folders can have arbitrary code inserted based on a specific PoC parameter. The main reason for the existence of this vulnerability is the controllability of the PlugName field within the struct. Pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240409100909-b1b7427c6ea6, corresponding to commit b1b7427c6ea6c7a027fa188c6be557f3795e732b, contains a patch for the issue. As a workaround, one may manually use a filtering method available in the GitHub Security Advisory to rectify the directory traversal problem.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 04/09/2024
This vulnerability exists within the gin-vue-admin backend system where a code injection flaw manifests through the Plugin System's Plugin Template functionality. The issue stems from insufficient input validation on the plugName parameter which allows attackers to manipulate directory traversal paths. When an attacker supplies a malicious plugName value, they can navigate to specific directories such as api, config, global, model, router, service, and main.go within the application's file structure. This vulnerability is categorized under CWE-22 as it represents a directory traversal attack that permits unauthorized access to restricted directories. The attack vector operates through the controllability of the PlugName field within the struct, which directly influences the file system operations performed by the application. This allows for arbitrary code insertion into Go source files within these designated directories, effectively enabling remote code execution capabilities.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe as it provides attackers with the ability to execute arbitrary code on the target system. The vulnerability affects version 2.6.1 of gin-vue-admin and is particularly dangerous because it allows for code injection in critical system components including the main.go file which serves as the entry point for the application. Attackers can leverage this vulnerability to establish persistent backdoors, exfiltrate sensitive data, or compromise the entire backend infrastructure. The directory traversal capability enables attackers to place malicious code in various system components, potentially affecting the application's core functionality and security posture. This vulnerability directly maps to ATT&CK technique T1059.006 for execution through Go programming languages and T1566.001 for initial access through vulnerabilities in web applications.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability include upgrading to the patched version corresponding to pseudoversion 0.0.0-20240409100909-b1b7427c6ea6 which contains the necessary security fixes. Organizations should implement proper input validation and sanitization for all user-supplied parameters, particularly those that influence file system operations. The recommended workaround involves manually implementing filtering mechanisms as suggested in the GitHub Security Advisory, which should validate and sanitize the plugName parameter to prevent directory traversal attempts. Additionally, organizations should conduct thorough code reviews focusing on file system operations and parameter handling within the plugin system. Security measures should include implementing strict access controls, monitoring for unusual file system activities, and employing automated vulnerability scanning tools to detect similar issues in other components. The fix addresses the root cause by ensuring that the PlugName field cannot be manipulated to traverse directories outside of intended boundaries, thereby preventing unauthorized code injection into critical system files.