CVE-2025-10015 in Sparkle
Summary
by MITRE • 09/16/2025
The Sparkle framework includes an XPC service Downloader.xpc, by default this service is private to the application its bundled with. A local unprivileged attacker can register this XPC service globally which will inherit TCC permissions of the application. Lack of validation of connecting client allows the attacker to copy TCC-protected files to an arbitrary location. Access to other resources beyond granted-permissions requires user interaction with a system prompt asking for permission.
This issue was fixed in version 2.7.2
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/16/2025
The Sparkle framework represents a popular software update mechanism for macOS applications, designed to facilitate automatic updates and provide seamless patch management for desktop software. This framework includes a component called Downloader.xpc which functions as an XPC service responsible for handling download operations within the application context. By default, this service operates with restricted privileges and maintains a private scope limited to the specific application that bundles it, ensuring that update functionality remains isolated and secure. The vulnerability arises from a design flaw in how the framework manages XPC service registration and privilege inheritance, creating a potential attack vector for local adversaries who can manipulate service registration behavior.
The core technical flaw involves the improper handling of XPC service registration where an unprivileged local attacker can register the Downloader.xpc service globally within the system namespace. This global registration allows the malicious service to inherit the Trust and Control (TCC) permissions that were originally granted to the legitimate application. The vulnerability stems from insufficient validation of connecting clients, meaning that any process can establish a connection to the service without proper authentication or authorization checks. This lack of client validation creates a privilege escalation scenario where the attacker can leverage the legitimate application's TCC permissions to perform unauthorized operations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple privilege escalation, as it enables an attacker to copy files that would normally be protected by TCC permissions to arbitrary locations on the system. This capability allows for data exfiltration, persistence establishment, or further attack vector exploitation through the placement of malicious payloads in system directories. The vulnerability requires local access and unprivileged user context, making it particularly concerning for environments where user accounts may be compromised. However, the attack chain does require user interaction for access to resources beyond the initially granted permissions, as system prompts will appear for additional permissions. This requirement for user interaction provides some defense-in-depth but does not eliminate the threat entirely.
The fix implemented in version 2.7.2 addresses this vulnerability through enhanced XPC service registration validation and proper client authentication mechanisms. The update ensures that XPC services cannot be registered globally by unauthorized processes and implements stricter validation of connecting clients to prevent privilege inheritance from malicious entities. This remediation aligns with security best practices for XPC service management and follows the principle of least privilege. Organizations should immediately update to version 2.7.2 or later to protect against this vulnerability, as it represents a significant risk to macOS application security. The issue demonstrates the importance of proper service isolation and authentication mechanisms in cross-process communication frameworks. This vulnerability type is classified as a privilege escalation vector with potential for data theft and system compromise, falling under the CWE category of insufficient validation of XPC service registration and client authentication. The attack pattern aligns with techniques described in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under privilege escalation and persistence tactics, specifically targeting macOS-specific security mechanisms. The vulnerability highlights the critical need for proper service registration controls and TCC permission management in macOS applications, particularly those implementing update mechanisms that may be exploited by local attackers.