CVE-2025-30051 in CLININET
Summary
by MITRE • 10/23/2026
The CGM CLININET application stores the production database login and password, as well as RabbitMQ broker credentials, in the SysIO.pl configuration file. Insecure file permissions make this file readable by any local account.
This issue was fixed in version 2026.MS3
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/23/2026
The vulnerability identified within the CGM CLININET application represents a critical failure in credential management and operating system access control mechanisms. Specifically, sensitive authentication data including production database login credentials and RabbitMQ broker connection details are hardcoded or stored in plaintext within the SysIO.pl configuration file. This practice alone violates fundamental security principles regarding the protection of secrets, as it exposes high-value assets to any entity with read access to the application's installation directory. The severity of this issue is significantly amplified by insecure file permissions assigned to the SysIO.pl file, which allow any local user account on the system to read its contents without restriction.
From a technical perspective, this flaw constitutes an improper privilege assignment vulnerability where default or misconfigured operating system access control lists fail to restrict sensitive files to authorized administrators only. In typical Linux and Unix-like environments, configuration files containing passwords should be restricted with permissions such as 600 or 400, ensuring that only the owner or specific service accounts can read them. By allowing world-readable access, the application inadvertently creates a local privilege escalation vector for any authenticated user on the host system. An attacker who gains even minimal shell access to the server could extract these credentials and subsequently gain unauthorized administrative control over both the underlying database infrastructure and the message broker services that support the application's communication architecture.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly in healthcare environments where CLININET is deployed. The exposure of production database credentials allows for potential data exfiltration, integrity manipulation, or denial of service against critical patient records stored within the backend database system. Furthermore, access to RabbitMQ broker credentials enables an attacker to intercept, modify, or inject messages into the application's internal communication channels. This could lead to unauthorized actions being performed by the application itself, such as triggering clinical alerts incorrectly, altering treatment plans, or disrupting real-time data synchronization between various hospital information systems that rely on this message queue for reliable delivery.
This vulnerability aligns with several well-known industry standards and taxonomies. It is classified under CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials when the passwords are embedded in the configuration file rather than managed through a secure vault or environment variables protected by OS-level restrictions. Additionally, it falls under CWE-250: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges if the application runs as root but exposes credentials to lower-privileged users, and more directly under CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource due to the world-readable file permissions. In terms of adversary tactics, this flaw facilitates initial access and credential harvesting techniques described in MITRE ATT&CK framework subtechniques such as T1087.004: Account Discovery - Local Account or T1552.004: Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys if similar key files were exposed, though here it is primarily about plaintext password discovery via local file access.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation steps must be taken by the system administrator even before upgrading to version 2026.MS3 which addresses the root cause. First, the permissions on the SysIO.pl configuration file should be immediately restricted using chmod commands to ensure that only the specific user account running the CLININET application can read and write to it. Ideally, this permission level should be set to owner-only access with no group or other privileges. Second, administrators should audit all other configuration files within the installation directory for similar permission issues to prevent lateral movement if one file is compromised. Third, where possible, credentials stored in plaintext should be migrated to a more secure storage mechanism such as an environment variable protected by OS permissions, a dedicated secrets management solution like HashiCorp Vault or AWS Secrets Manager, or encrypted configuration files that require specific decryption keys not accessible via simple read operations.
Long-term architectural improvements are necessary to prevent recurrence of this class of vulnerability. The application vendor should implement automated security scanning in their development pipeline to detect hardcoded credentials and insecure file permissions before release. For the end-user organization, implementing a principle of least privilege across all server components is essential. This includes ensuring that service accounts have minimal required access rights and that configuration files are never stored with world-readable permissions. Regular audits of file system permissions on production servers should be conducted to identify any drift from secure baseline configurations. Upgrading to version 2026.MS3 as recommended by the vendor will resolve the underlying issue, but immediate manual permission hardening is required to protect sensitive data during the transition period.