CVE-2025-30050 in CLININET
Summary
by MITRE • 10/23/2026
CGM CLININET is vulnerable to Code Injection in the RunCGI.pm component, which dynamically imports the module specified as a query parameter and executes code from untrusted data provided by the user. An attacker from adjacent network can supply a crafted query parameter to have an attacker-controlled module imported which results in arbitrary code execution with root privileges.
This issue was fixed in version 2026.MS3
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/23/2026
The vulnerability identified within CGM CLININET represents a critical security flaw located specifically in the RunCGI.pm component, classified fundamentally as an improper neutralization of special elements used in code injection or dynamic code execution. This issue stems from a design pattern where the application dynamically imports Perl modules based on user-supplied input passed via query parameters without sufficient validation or sanitization. In secure software architecture, dynamic loading of external libraries should be strictly controlled to prevent attackers from influencing which code is executed within the server environment. Here, the lack of rigorous input filtering allows an adversary to manipulate the module name parameter, effectively tricking the application into importing and executing arbitrary Perl modules that are under the attacker's control rather than legitimate internal system components.
From a technical perspective, this flaw leverages the dynamic nature of Perl’s require or use statements when fed untrusted data. When the RunCGI.pm script processes a request, it takes the value provided in the query string and uses it to determine which module to load into memory for execution. Because there are no restrictions on the format or source of this parameter, an attacker can supply a path to a maliciously crafted Perl file hosted on their own server or within the local filesystem if accessible paths are allowed. Once imported, the code contained within that external module is executed in the context of the application process. This mechanism bypasses standard static analysis protections and allows for direct manipulation of the application's runtime behavior through injected logic rather than just data injection attacks like SQLi or XSS.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the privilege level at which the CLININET web server typically operates. The description indicates that successful exploitation results in arbitrary code execution with root privileges, meaning the attacker gains full control over the underlying operating system hosting the medical device software. This level of access allows for complete compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. An adversary could exfiltrate sensitive patient health information stored on the server, modify clinical data to alter treatment records, install persistent backdoors for long-term access, or disrupt critical healthcare services by shutting down essential processes. The ability to execute code as root eliminates any operating system-level containment that might otherwise limit the blast radius of a web application compromise.
In terms of industry standard classifications, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code (Code Injection) and specifically relates to CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data if the module loading involves serialization mechanisms, though it is primarily a dynamic code execution flaw. From an offensive security perspective, such exploitation techniques are documented in MITRE ATT&CK under T1647 Privilege Escalation: Host Resource Hijacking or potentially T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter if the injected code invokes system commands directly. The attack vector is classified as adjacent network because it requires the attacker to be on the same local network segment, which is common in hospital environments where medical devices are often placed on isolated VLANs for performance but remain accessible from other internal systems that may already be compromised or used by malicious insiders.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary defense is to apply the vendor-provided patch available in version 2026.MS3, which likely implements strict allow-listing of permissible module names rather than accepting arbitrary input for dynamic loading. If upgrading is not immediately feasible, network segmentation should be enforced to restrict access to the CLININET server only from authorized management stations and clinical workstations, blocking all other adjacent traffic. Additionally, implementing a Web Application Firewall with rules that detect suspicious patterns in query parameters related to module names or file paths can provide an additional layer of defense. Developers must also adopt secure coding practices by avoiding dynamic imports based on user input entirely; instead, they should use static mappings where the application logic explicitly selects predefined modules based on validated command codes rather than raw strings provided by users.