CVE-2026-115994 in Cervantes
Summary
by MITRE • 10/24/2026
BOLA Allows Cross-Project Target Tampering in Cervantes version v1.3-beta could allow an attacker modify or delete targets belonging to other projects without authorization, compromising the integrity of penetration testing scopes, results, and associated security reports.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/24/2026
The vulnerability identified as a Broken Object Level Authorization flaw within Cervantes version 1.3-beta represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms that governs how users interact with specific data objects. In this context, the application fails to adequately verify whether an authenticated user has permission to modify or delete target assets associated with projects other than their own. This architectural deficiency allows an attacker who possesses valid credentials for one project to manipulate targets belonging to entirely separate projects within the same instance of the software. The core technical flaw lies in the server-side logic, which likely relies on client-supplied identifiers such as project IDs without performing a rigorous authorization check against the user's assigned roles and permissions database. By bypassing these checks, an attacker can send crafted API requests or HTTP payloads that reference target objects outside their authorized scope, effectively tricking the application into executing destructive actions on resources they do not own.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the sensitive nature of penetration testing environments. Cervantes serves as a platform for managing security assessments, where targets represent specific systems, networks, or applications under review. Unauthorized modification or deletion of these targets compromises the integrity of the entire assessment lifecycle. If an attacker alters target configurations, they can disrupt ongoing tests, leading to inaccurate results and potentially masking real vulnerabilities from security teams. Furthermore, if targets are deleted, it may cause significant operational downtime for the organizations being tested and force a complete restart of complex testing campaigns. The compromise extends beyond immediate availability; it undermines trust in the generated security reports, as these documents rely on accurate data regarding which systems were scanned and what findings were discovered. This erosion of integrity can lead to flawed decision-making by CISOs and other stakeholders who depend on these reports for risk management strategies.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns directly with CWE-639, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where the application uses user-controlled input to determine access rights without proper validation against server-side policies. It also maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, as exploitation requires initial authentication but leverages those credentials to perform unauthorized actions across organizational boundaries within the application. Additionally, it relates to CWE-269, Improper Privilege Management, because the user is exercising privileges that exceed their assigned role or project scope. The attack vector typically involves HTTP requests where parameters such as target IDs are manipulated while maintaining a valid session token for an unrelated project, exploiting the lack of cross-project isolation in the authorization logic.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing robust server-side access control checks at every endpoint that handles object modification or deletion. Developers should ensure that all API endpoints verify not only user authentication but also explicit authorization by checking if the authenticated user has ownership or specific permissions for the target resource being accessed. This can be achieved by joining database queries with permission tables to validate relationships between users, projects, and targets before executing any write operations. Input validation alone is insufficient; the application must enforce strict object-level security policies that prevent cross-project data access unless explicitly permitted by an administrator role. Additionally, implementing comprehensive logging of all target modification events can aid in detecting such unauthorized attempts post-exploitation. Regular code reviews focusing on authorization logic and automated testing using tools designed to detect BOLA vulnerabilities are essential steps to remediate this issue and restore the integrity of the penetration testing workflow.