CVE-2026-116015 in yudao-cloud
Summary
by MITRE • 10/24/2026
yudao-cloud through 2026.09 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in the mall trade module that allows authenticated members to read other members' after-sale operation logs by supplying arbitrary afterSaleId values. Attackers can enumerate sequential after-sale IDs against GET /app-api/trade/after-sale-log/list to expose refund amounts, status transitions and timestamps belonging to other members.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/24/2026
The vulnerability identified in yudao-cloud through version 2026.09 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms within the mall trade module, specifically classified as an Insecure Direct Object Reference or IDOR. This flaw stems from the application's reliance on client-supplied identifiers to perform security checks without adequately verifying that the requesting user has authorization for the specific resource being accessed. The core technical deficiency lies in the endpoint GET /app-api/trade/after-sale-log/list, which processes requests containing an afterSaleId parameter but fails to bind this identifier to the authenticated session's context. Consequently, any member who successfully authenticates into the system can manipulate this input variable to reference data belonging to other users. This lack of server-side validation allows for unauthorized access to sensitive operational logs associated with customer service interactions and financial transactions.
From an offensive perspective, this vulnerability enables a straightforward enumeration attack against sequential after-sale identifiers. By iterating through integer values in the afterSaleId parameter, an attacker can systematically probe the database or backend logic to discover valid records belonging to other members. This process does not require complex exploitation techniques but rather relies on predictable identifier generation and insufficient authorization checks at the application layer. The operational impact of this exposure is significant as it compromises the confidentiality of private business data. Attackers can extract detailed information including refund amounts, which reveals financial outcomes for specific transactions; status transitions that indicate the progress or resolution state of customer disputes; and precise timestamps that may correlate with other activities or reveal patterns in user behavior. Such leakage not only violates privacy expectations but also provides adversaries with intelligence useful for further social engineering attacks or targeted fraud schemes.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-639, which defines Insecure Direct Object References as a flaw where an application exposes internal implementation objects like files, directories, or database keys to the user via direct references in URLs or parameters without proper access control checks. Furthermore, from a tactical standpoint within the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this behavior corresponds to T1078 Valid Accounts and potentially T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie if session hijacking is involved, though primarily it falls under data exfiltration techniques where sensitive information is retrieved through unauthorized API calls. The exploitation path demonstrates how authentication alone is insufficient for security; authorization logic must explicitly verify that the authenticated user owns or has permission to view the specific resource identified by the object reference.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing robust access control checks at every point of data retrieval. Developers should ensure that all database queries involving sensitive resources, such as after-sale logs, include strict validation that links the requested record's owner identifier with the currently authenticated user's identity. This can be achieved by modifying the backend logic to retrieve records based on a join between the transaction table and the user account table, ensuring only rows where the user_id matches the session context are returned. Additionally, implementing random or non-sequential identifiers for after-sale operations would mitigate enumeration attacks, although this is secondary to fixing the fundamental authorization flaw. Input validation should also be enforced to ensure that supplied IDs match expected formats, preventing potential injection attempts alongside IDOR exploitation. Regular security testing and code reviews focusing on object-level access control are essential to prevent similar vulnerabilities in other modules of the application.