CVE-2026-115975 in Cervantes
Summary
by MITRE • 10/24/2026
Broken access control in JiraController in Cervantes version v1.3-beta could allow an attacker to create, edit, or delete Jira tickets for vulnerabilities in other projects
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/24/2026
The vulnerability identified as a broken access control issue within the JiraController component of Cervantes version 1.3-beta represents a critical flaw in the application's authorization logic. This specific defect allows an authenticated attacker to bypass intended security restrictions, enabling them to perform actions such as creating, editing, or deleting Jira tickets associated with vulnerabilities that belong to other projects. In secure software architecture, access control mechanisms must strictly enforce the principle of least privilege and ensure that users can only interact with resources they are explicitly authorized to manage. The failure in this implementation suggests a lack of proper object-level permission checks when processing requests directed at the Jira integration endpoint. Instead of validating whether the current user has administrative or contributor rights for the specific project linked to the target ticket, the controller likely relies on insufficient validation logic that permits cross-project manipulation based solely on valid authentication credentials.
From a technical perspective, this flaw aligns with CWE-284 Improper Access Control and specifically reflects issues related to horizontal privilege escalation where an actor accesses resources belonging to other entities at the same security level. The operational impact of such a vulnerability is severe for organizations relying on Cervantes for vulnerability management workflows. An attacker could manipulate the integrity of incident response processes by altering ticket statuses, changing severity ratings, or deleting critical records that track known vulnerabilities in separate projects. This not only compromises the accuracy and reliability of the organization's security posture but also undermines trust in automated remediation pipelines. Furthermore, malicious actors might use this capability to obfuscate their activities by modifying tickets related to other teams' infrastructure, thereby delaying detection and response efforts across different departments or business units within the enterprise.
The attack vector for exploiting this vulnerability typically involves sending crafted HTTP requests to the JiraController endpoint with parameters targeting resources outside the attacker's authorized scope. Since the flaw resides in the controller logic rather than input validation per se, standard sanitization techniques may not mitigate the issue without explicit authorization checks being added to the request handling process. This type of defect is particularly dangerous because it often goes undetected by automated vulnerability scanners that focus on injection or cross-site scripting flaws, requiring manual code review or advanced penetration testing focused specifically on business logic and access control enforcement.
To remediate this vulnerability, developers must implement robust object-level authorization checks within the JiraController. This involves verifying that the authenticated user possesses the necessary permissions for the specific project associated with each ticket before allowing any create, update, or delete operations. It is essential to integrate these checks into a centralized access control service rather than scattering logic throughout individual controllers to ensure consistency and maintainability. Additionally, implementing audit logging for all changes made to Jira tickets can provide visibility into unauthorized attempts and aid in forensic analysis if an incident occurs. Organizations should also consider adopting defense-in-depth strategies by validating permissions at the API gateway level or using middleware that enforces role-based access control policies before requests reach the application logic. Regular security code reviews focusing on authorization flows are recommended to prevent similar logical flaws from being introduced during future development cycles, ensuring alignment with industry standards such as OWASP Top 10 and MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to privilege escalation and resource manipulation.