CVE-2025-48613 in Android
Summary
by MITRE • 03/02/2026
In VBMeta, there is a possible way to modify and resign VBMeta using a test key, assuming the original image was previously signed with the same key. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
Be aware that VulDB is the high quality source for vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 03/09/2026
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2025-48613 resides within the Verified Boot Meta (VBMeta) component of Android systems, representing a critical security flaw that undermines the integrity verification mechanisms designed to protect device firmware and boot processes. This vulnerability specifically affects the verification and signing procedures implemented in the Android Verified Boot framework, which is crucial for ensuring that only authenticated and trusted software executes on a device during the boot sequence.
The technical flaw manifests when VBMeta images can be modified and resigned using test keys, provided that the original image was previously signed with the same key. This represents a fundamental weakness in the key management and signature validation process within the Android security architecture. The vulnerability operates at the core of the boot verification chain where the system should enforce strict signature validation but instead allows for unauthorized modifications when the same test key is present. This issue stems from insufficient validation of the signing key context and fails to properly enforce the distinction between production and test key usage during the verification process.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe as it enables local privilege escalation without requiring any additional execution privileges or user interaction for exploitation. An attacker with local access to a device can leverage this flaw to modify the VBMeta image, effectively bypassing the boot integrity checks that are fundamental to Android security. The absence of user interaction requirements makes this vulnerability particularly dangerous as it can be exploited automatically without any human intervention, potentially allowing attackers to install malicious firmware modifications that persist across reboots. This capability directly violates the core security principles of the Android Verified Boot system, which is designed to prevent unauthorized modifications to the boot chain.
The vulnerability aligns with CWE-316 (Credentials in a File) and CWE-312 (Sensitive Data in Memory) categories, as it involves improper handling of cryptographic keys and signature validation. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation) and T1547.001 (Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder) as it enables local privilege escalation and potentially persistent malicious modifications. The exploitability of this vulnerability is significantly enhanced by the fact that it requires no additional execution privileges, meaning that even users with minimal permissions can leverage this flaw. This represents a critical failure in the Android security model where the system should enforce strict key isolation between test and production environments.
Mitigation strategies should focus on implementing stronger key validation mechanisms within the VBMeta signing process, ensuring that test keys cannot be used to modify production images even when the same key is present. System administrators should immediately update to patched versions of Android that address this vulnerability and implement strict key management policies that prevent the use of test keys in production environments. The solution requires modifications to the Android Verified Boot framework to enforce stricter validation of key contexts and prevent the reuse of test keys for production image modifications. Additionally, organizations should conduct comprehensive security audits to identify any potential exploitation attempts and ensure that all devices are updated with the latest security patches to prevent unauthorized modifications to the boot chain.