CVE-2025-71421 in community-skeleton
Summary
by MITRE • 09/21/2026
UVdesk core-framework before 1.1.7 contains an improper privilege management vulnerability in the editAgent endpoint that allows agents with agent-management privilege to escalate their own role to administrator. Attackers can submit their own account identifier with a role parameter set to ROLE_ADMIN to gain full administrative control over agents, tickets, and mail configuration.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/21/2026
The UVdesk core-framework prior to version 1.1.7 contains a critical insecure direct object reference combined with broken access control vulnerability within the editAgent endpoint. This flaw stems from improper privilege management where the application fails to adequately verify whether an authenticated user has sufficient permissions to modify their own role assignment or that of other users in a manner that bypasses intended security boundaries. Specifically, the backend logic processes requests to update agent profiles without strictly validating if the requested role change is authorized for the initiating actor's current permission level. This allows any user possessing basic agent-management privileges to manipulate input parameters associated with account roles, effectively circumventing the hierarchical access controls designed to restrict administrative functions to designated administrators only.
From a technical perspective, the vulnerability exploits the lack of server-side validation on the role parameter during profile updates. An attacker who has obtained valid credentials for an account with standard agent-level permissions can craft a malicious HTTP request targeting the editAgent endpoint. By modifying the payload to include their own user identifier alongside a role parameter set to ROLE_ADMIN, the application accepts this input and persists the change in its database or session state without checking if such elevation is permissible under current security policies. This represents a classic case of vertical privilege escalation where a lower-privileged entity gains higher-level access rights through manipulation of client-supplied data that should have been sanitized or validated against strict authorization rules defined by the framework's role-based access control model.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it grants attackers full administrative control over the UVdesk instance. Once elevated to an administrator role, the compromised account can manage all agents within the system, potentially adding malicious users or removing security personnel. Furthermore, administrators have unrestricted access to ticket management systems, allowing them to view sensitive customer communications, alter support workflows, and delete critical records for evidence destruction. The most damaging aspect involves mail configuration capabilities; attackers can modify SMTP settings, email templates, and notification rules, which may facilitate phishing campaigns using the organization's legitimate domain or disrupt business continuity by breaking outgoing communication channels. This level of access compromises confidentiality, integrity, and availability across the entire helpdesk infrastructure.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management and CWE-862 Missing Authorization in the Common Weakness Enumeration database. In terms of offensive security frameworks, it corresponds to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts, specifically involving lateral movement or persistence through privilege escalation within a local system context. The exploitation path resembles common patterns seen in web application attacks where session management and role assignment logic are not sufficiently isolated from user input manipulation.
Mitigation strategies require immediate upgrading of the UVdesk core-framework to version 1.1.7 or later, which addresses these authorization checks by implementing strict server-side validation for all role modification requests. Administrators should enforce principle of least privilege across their deployment, ensuring that no single agent account holds excessive permissions unless absolutely necessary for operational requirements. Additionally, organizations should implement robust input validation and output encoding practices within custom integrations using the framework to prevent similar logic flaws from being introduced in extended modules. Regular security audits focusing on access control lists and role-based permission matrices are recommended to detect any misconfigurations that could allow unauthorized privilege escalation before exploitation occurs.