CVE-2026-100177 in AIL Framework
Summary
by MITRE • 09/25/2026
The AIL Framework crawler task creation API (api_add_crawler_task) contained an insufficient authorization check when a user supplied a cookiejar UUID to attach to a one-shot or scheduled crawler task. The original code only verified that the cookiejar existed and, if its access level was 0, compared the cookiejar's owning user ID to the requesting user ID. It did not validate organizational boundaries, did not account for the requesting user's role. When the cookiejar level was not 0, no access check was performed at all. An authenticated user could therefore reference another organization's cookiejar by UUID and have the crawler use that organization's stored cookies (session tokens, authentication credentials) when performing web crawls, effectively leaking or exfiltrating the victim organization's session data.
The vulnerability requires an authenticated user with the ability to create crawler tasks. The attacker must know or guess a valid cookiejar UUID belonging to another organization. The impact is unauthorized access to another organization's stored cookies and session data through the crawler infrastructure.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/25/2026
The AIL Framework contains a critical authorization flaw within its crawler task creation API, specifically in the api_add_crawler_task endpoint, which allows authenticated users to bypass organizational boundaries when attaching cookie jars to one-shot or scheduled crawling tasks. This vulnerability stems from an insufficient access control implementation that fails to validate whether the requesting user belongs to the same organization as the target resource. The original code logic only performed a basic existence check and, in cases where the cookie jar's access level was zero, compared the owning user ID against the requesting user ID. However, this approach is fundamentally flawed because it ignores multi-tenancy principles and does not account for the specific roles or organizational affiliations of the users involved. When the cookie jar access level exceeded zero, no access check was performed at all, creating a complete bypass of security controls that should restrict resource usage to authorized entities within the same tenant context.
This technical flaw enables an authenticated user with permissions to create crawler tasks to reference and utilize cookie jars belonging to other organizations by simply supplying their universally unique identifiers. By leveraging these external resources, the attacker can force the crawling infrastructure to use session tokens and authentication credentials stored in those cookie jars. This results in a severe data leakage scenario where sensitive session data is exfiltrated through legitimate system operations. The attack requires minimal prerequisites; the adversary only needs valid authentication credentials for their own account and knowledge or ability to guess a valid UUID associated with another organization's cookie jar. Once these conditions are met, the attacker can effectively impersonate users from other organizations by utilizing their active sessions during web crawls, leading to unauthorized access to protected resources and potential compromise of downstream systems that trust those session tokens.
From an industry standard perspective, this vulnerability is a classic example of Broken Access Control, categorized under CWE-284 in the Common Weakness Enumeration database. The failure to enforce proper ownership checks across organizational boundaries aligns with insecure direct object references where the application relies on client-supplied identifiers without validating that the requester has permission to access them. In terms of tactical mapping within the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this behavior corresponds to Account Manipulation and potentially Credential Access, as it allows an attacker to leverage existing valid credentials from other tenants to gain unauthorized footholds or escalate privileges within interconnected systems. The exploitation leverages legitimate functionality for malicious purposes, making detection through standard logging mechanisms difficult without specific anomaly detection focused on cross-tenant resource access patterns.
To mitigate this vulnerability, the AIL Framework must implement strict multi-tenancy checks at the API level before processing any request that references external resources such as cookie jars. The authorization logic should verify not only that the user exists and has task creation privileges but also that they belong to the same organization or have explicit cross-tenant permissions granted by an administrator. This requires integrating organizational identifiers into every access control decision, ensuring that resource ownership is validated against the requester's tenant context rather than just matching user IDs in a flat hierarchy. Additionally, implementing role-based access controls can further restrict which users are permitted to attach external cookie jars to crawler tasks. Regular security audits and penetration testing focused on cross-tenant isolation should be conducted to ensure that similar flaws do not exist elsewhere in the application logic.