CVE-2026-100730 in openPDC
Summary
by MITRE • 10/09/2026
A service console interface on openPDC and openHistorian deserializes a client-supplied data structure. On systems using Windows Authentication, an attacker must already be authenticated to reach this function; on systems without Windows Authentication, this is reachable by an unauthenticated network attacker. This allows an attacker to trigger deserialization of an arbitrary object graph, which could allow remote code execution under the privileges of the affected service account.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/09/2026
The vulnerability identified in openPDC and openHistorian represents a critical insecure deserialization flaw within their respective service console interfaces. These systems are designed for power grid monitoring and historical data logging, making them integral components of industrial control environments where availability and integrity are paramount. The core technical issue stems from the application's handling of client-supplied data structures during communication with the management interface. Specifically, the software fails to validate or sanitize input before passing it to a deserialization mechanism that reconstructs objects in memory. This architectural oversight allows an attacker who can interact with the service console to inject malicious payloads disguised as legitimate serialized data objects.
The severity of this vulnerability is significantly influenced by the authentication configuration of the target system. In deployments utilizing Windows Authentication, access to the vulnerable function requires prior successful authentication, meaning the threat actor must already possess valid credentials within the domain or local security context. However, in configurations where Windows Authentication is disabled or not enforced for the console interface, the attack surface expands dramatically. An unauthenticated attacker operating on the network can directly interact with the service endpoint and trigger the deserialization process without any prior authentication barrier. This lack of access control transforms a potentially internal threat into a remote exploit vector accessible to external adversaries who have network connectivity to the affected services.
From an operational perspective, the successful exploitation of this flaw leads to arbitrary code execution under the privileges of the service account running openPDC or openHistorian. Since these services often run with elevated permissions necessary for reading hardware registers and writing to system logs, a compromise can result in full control over the host operating system. An attacker could install backdoors, exfiltrate sensitive grid data, modify historical records to obscure malicious activity, or pivot further into the network by using the compromised machine as a foothold. The impact extends beyond individual hosts, potentially affecting the stability and reliability of broader power distribution networks that rely on these systems for real-time monitoring and control decisions.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-502, which describes deserialization of untrusted data, a category of flaws where applications reconstruct objects from serialized input without verifying their integrity or origin. The attack technique is consistent with MITRE ATT&CK tactic T1203, specifically the sub-technique for exploitation of client-side software vulnerabilities through object injection. Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate remediation by applying vendor-provided patches that address the deserialization logic to ensure only trusted and expected data types are processed. In environments where patching is not immediately feasible, network segmentation should be enforced to restrict access to the service console interfaces exclusively from authorized management stations. Additionally, enforcing strict authentication policies such as Windows Authentication or implementing robust input validation at the application layer can significantly reduce the risk of exploitation by ensuring that only authenticated and validated requests are processed by the vulnerable components.