CVE-2026-100752 in Real Estate Manager Extension
Summary
by MITRE • 09/28/2026
Joomla Extension - ordasoft.com - Unauthenticated SQL Injection in Real Estate Manager (Free) < 6.7.9 - site/realestatemanager.php builds the ORDER BY clause of three separate frontend property-listing queries (category browsing, search results, and the full property listing) from a request-controlled order_field parameter, concatenated directly into an unquoted SQL clause with no allow-list of real column names and no cast.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/28/2026
The vulnerability identified in Joomla Real Estate Manager versions prior to 6.7.9 represents a critical security flaw rooted in improper input validation and the construction of dynamic SQL queries. Specifically, the application endpoint located at site/realestatemanager.php processes user-supplied data through an order_field parameter to determine the sorting criteria for property listings. This functionality is utilized across three distinct frontend operations: category browsing, search result display, and the comprehensive property listing view. The core technical deficiency lies in how this parameter is integrated into the database query structure. Rather than validating the input against a strict allow-list of legitimate column names or employing prepared statements with type casting, the application directly concatenates the user-controlled value into an unquoted SQL ORDER BY clause. This architectural decision bypasses standard sanitization mechanisms that typically protect against injection attacks in more complex clauses, as developers often mistakenly assume that sorting parameters are less susceptible to exploitation than data retrieval fields like WHERE or SELECT columns.
From a technical perspective, this flaw constitutes an Unauthenticated SQL Injection vulnerability, classified under CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command. Because the input is not quoted and lacks any form of validation, an attacker can inject arbitrary SQL syntax directly into the ORDER BY clause. While traditional SQL injection often targets data exfiltration via UNION-based attacks which require specific column counts, injection within an ORDER BY clause allows for different exploitation vectors. An attacker can manipulate the sorting logic to cause errors that reveal database schema information through error-based techniques or utilize boolean-based and time-based blind injection methods to extract sensitive data from the backend MySQL database. The absence of authentication requirements means this vulnerability is accessible to any anonymous user visiting the public-facing website, significantly lowering the barrier for exploitation and increasing the potential attack surface considerably.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data leakage. Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized access to confidential property owner details, contact information, pricing structures, and other sensitive records stored within the Joomla database. Furthermore, an attacker with sufficient privileges could potentially modify or delete critical application data by chaining this injection with administrative functions if session hijacking is also possible due to weak security configurations often found in older extensions. The integrity of the web application is compromised as attackers can alter query execution plans, leading to denial-of-service conditions through resource-intensive queries or causing application crashes that disrupt service availability for legitimate users. This aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter if further exploitation leads to remote code execution via database functions such as INTO OUTFILE, although the primary impact here remains focused on data access and manipulation through SQL injection pathways categorized under TA0006: Credential Access or TA0007: Discovery depending on the specific payload used.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate remediation of the input validation logic within the affected extension codebase. The most effective solution involves implementing a strict allow-list approach where only predefined, valid database column names are accepted for the order_field parameter. Any value not present in this whitelist should be rejected or defaulted to a safe standard sorting option such as ID or date created. Alternatively, developers can utilize Joomla's built-in database abstraction layer methods that properly escape and validate inputs before query execution. For organizations unable to immediately patch the extension due to compatibility concerns with other plugins, deploying a Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule to detect and block SQL injection patterns within ORDER BY clauses provides an essential compensating control. Regular security audits and code reviews focusing on dynamic SQL construction are recommended to prevent similar vulnerabilities in future updates or custom modifications of the Joomla platform.