CVE-2026-101261 in ZHOME A0101
Summary
by MITRE • 09/29/2026
A flaw has been found in Ziroom ZHOME A0101 1.0.1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file /api/ZRnetwork/firstSetup_wifi. Executing a manipulation of the argument login_pwd can lead to command injection. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been published and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/29/2026
The Ziroom ZHOME A0101 smart home gateway running firmware version 1.0.1.0 contains a critical security vulnerability within its network configuration interface, specifically affecting the file located at /api/ZRnetwork/firstSetup_wifi. This component is responsible for handling initial Wi-Fi setup parameters and processes user-supplied input to configure device connectivity. The flaw manifests as an unvalidated command injection weakness where the login_pwd argument fails to undergo proper sanitization or encoding before being passed to underlying system commands. Consequently, an attacker can inject arbitrary shell commands by manipulating this parameter, bypassing intended security controls that should restrict execution to legitimate configuration operations only.
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command commonly known as OS Command Injection. The technical root cause lies in the application's failure to escape or filter special characters such as semicolons, pipes, and ampersands within the password field before concatenating it into a system call string. Because this endpoint is exposed over the network interface of the device, the attack vector is remote, allowing an adversary with access to the local network segment where the ZHOME hub resides to exploit the flaw without requiring prior authentication or physical proximity to the hardware. The presence of a published exploit further lowers the barrier for entry, enabling even attackers with limited technical expertise to compromise the system by leveraging existing proof-of-concept code available in public repositories.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe as it grants an attacker full command-line access on the underlying operating system running the smart home gateway. This level of control allows for complete device takeover, including reading sensitive configuration files, exfiltrating stored credentials such as Wi-Fi passwords and API keys, installing persistent backdoors or malware, and pivoting to other devices on the same local network segment. Given that these gateways often serve as central hubs connecting various IoT sensors and actuators, compromising one unit can lead to a broader compromise of the entire smart home ecosystem, disrupting automation workflows and potentially exposing private household data to unauthorized parties.
From an adversary perspective, this exploitation aligns with ATT&CK techniques related to Command and Scripting Interpreter abuse, specifically lateral movement or collection methods that leverage local system access for further reconnaissance and persistence. The lack of response from the vendor regarding early disclosure attempts indicates a significant gap in their security patch management process, leaving users exposed until they manually update firmware if updates become available later. Mitigation strategies should prioritize immediate network segmentation to isolate these devices from critical infrastructure and sensitive data networks using VLANs or firewall rules that restrict outbound connections and limit inbound access to trusted administrative IPs only. Additionally, administrators should enforce strong, complex passwords for all connected services and monitor device logs for unusual command execution patterns until a patched firmware version is released by the manufacturer.