CVE-2026-107052 in MAXS Module FileRead
Summary
by MITRE • 10/29/2026
Insecure permissions in the AIDL interface of ProjectMAXS MAXS Module FileRead versionCode 27 allows unauthorized attackers to arbitrarily reead files outside of the sandbox via providing an absolute path.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/29/2026
The vulnerability identified within the Android Interface Definition Language, or AIDL, implementation of the ProjectMAXS MAXS Module FileRead component represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms specific to mobile operating system architectures. This flaw is rooted in the improper validation of input parameters passed through inter-process communication channels, allowing external entities to bypass standard sandboxing restrictions that are fundamental to Android security models. The core technical deficiency lies in the lack of rigorous path normalization and boundary checking when processing file read requests. By accepting absolute paths without verifying whether they reside within the designated application data directory or other permitted scopes, the module inadvertently exposes sensitive system files and private user data to any process with access to this specific AIDL interface. This behavior directly contradicts the principle of least privilege, which dictates that components should only have access to resources necessary for their function.
From a technical perspective, this issue aligns closely with CWE-284, which describes Improper Access Control, and more specifically CWE-732, concerning Permission Assignment Errors in Critical Information Resources. The vulnerability enables an attacker who has gained the ability to invoke this AIDL interface to read arbitrary files from the device storage or system partitions that are typically protected by file permissions and SELinux policies. In many Android implementations, certain privileged services may expose interfaces with overly permissive configurations if not properly secured during development. When a malicious application or compromised process interacts with FileRead versionCode 27 using an absolute path such as /data/local/tmp/sensitive_data.txt or even system configuration files like /system/build.prop, the underlying service fails to restrict access based on the caller's identity or intended scope. This allows for the exfiltration of confidential information that should remain isolated within specific application sandboxes.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly in enterprise environments where mobile device management solutions rely on such modules for legitimate file retrieval operations. An attacker can leverage this flaw to conduct unauthorized surveillance by reading personal messages, credentials stored in shared preferences, or proprietary corporate documents residing on the device. Furthermore, if the service runs with elevated privileges due to its integration within a larger security framework like ProjectMAXS, the potential scope of damage expands significantly. The ability to read files outside the sandbox undermines the integrity of the entire mobile ecosystem's trust model. Attackers can use this information for further exploitation phases, such as credential stuffing attacks against user accounts or gathering intelligence for targeted social engineering campaigns. In worst-case scenarios involving root-level exploits combined with this flaw, attackers could potentially access kernel logs or other low-level system artifacts that reveal additional security configurations and weaknesses.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing strict input validation and enforcing robust access control lists at the service level. Developers should ensure that all file paths provided through AIDL interfaces are normalized to remove any directory traversal sequences such as ../ and then verified against a whitelist of allowed directories associated with the calling application's package name. Additionally, integrating checks for SELinux contexts can prevent processes from accessing resources they do not have explicit permission to read according to policy definitions. It is also advisable to audit all exposed AIDL interfaces regularly to ensure that only necessary methods are public and that each method includes appropriate signature-based or permission-based authentication mechanisms. Updating the MAXS Module FileRead component to a patched version where these checks are enforced is essential for immediate remediation. Organizations should also monitor logs for unusual patterns of file access requests originating from non-system applications, which may indicate active exploitation attempts against this vulnerability.