CVE-2026-119712 in PipesHub
Summary
by MITRE • 10/30/2026
PipesHub before 0.10.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in ImageParser._fetch_single_url that allows attackers to make the indexing service fetch internal addresses by embedding image URLs in documents. Attackers can supply Markdown or HTML via uploads, synced mailboxes, or web connectors to reach loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints, with image responses embedded into indexed content.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/30/2026
PipesHub versions prior to 0.10.0 are susceptible to a critical server-side request forgery vulnerability located within the ImageParser._fetch_single_url function. This flaw arises from insufficient validation of user-supplied input during the processing of image resources, allowing malicious actors to manipulate the application into initiating HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations controlled by the attacker. The core technical deficiency lies in the lack of strict allow-listing or rigorous sanitization protocols for URLs embedded within documents processed by the indexing service. When a document containing an image reference is ingested, the system attempts to fetch and parse the associated image data without adequately verifying whether the target address resides on a trusted domain or falls outside permitted network boundaries. This architectural oversight enables attackers to craft payloads that redirect internal processing logic toward sensitive infrastructure endpoints rather than public internet resources.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its potential for unauthorized access to internal network segments and cloud metadata services. Attackers can exploit the indexing service by supplying malicious Markdown or HTML content through various ingestion vectors, including direct file uploads, synchronized mailboxes, or web connectors. By embedding specially crafted image URLs within these documents, an attacker forces the server to make outbound requests to loopback addresses such as 127.0.0.1, private network ranges like 192.168.x.x or 10.x.x.x, and cloud metadata endpoints typically found at static IP addresses such as 169.254.169.254 for AWS or similar constructs in other cloud providers. These internal services often contain sensitive configuration data, authentication tokens, or system credentials that are not intended to be exposed over the network. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because the resulting image responses can be embedded directly into the indexed content, potentially allowing further exploitation through subsequent search queries or document rendering processes where the fetched data might be interpreted as legitimate application output.
From a classification perspective, this issue aligns with CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), which describes flaws in server-side code that allow an attacker to cause the server to make requests to unintended destinations. The attack vector leverages ATT&CK technique T1557, specifically Adversary-in-the-Middle or Lateral Tool Transfer mechanisms where internal services are abused to gather intelligence about the network topology and connected systems. Furthermore, it relates to CWE-20 Improper Input Validation as the root cause is the failure to restrict input data to expected formats and domains. The ability to reach cloud metadata endpoints poses a significant risk of credential theft, potentially leading to full compromise of associated cloud infrastructure if access keys or instance profiles are retrieved via these internal requests.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate patching to version 0.10.0 or later where this logic has been corrected with robust input validation and network egress controls. In the interim, administrators should implement strict firewall rules that restrict outbound HTTP traffic from the PipesHub application server to only known external domains required for legitimate functionality, effectively blocking access to private IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints at the network perimeter. Additionally, deploying a web application firewall capable of detecting SSRF patterns in request headers or body content can provide an additional layer of defense by identifying and blocking attempts to resolve internal hostnames or IPs. Input sanitization should also be enforced at the application level to ensure that only whitelisted domains are permitted for image fetching operations, thereby neutralizing the attack vector before it reaches the vulnerable parsing function.