CVE-2026-61730 in CoPilot
Summary
by MITRE • 10/30/2026
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. In affected deployments, the unauthenticated `/scoutsuite-report` `StaticFiles` mount in `backend/copilot.py` exposes the `scoutsuite-report` directory even though normal /api routes require JWT authentication. Generated HTML reports and `scoutsuite-results/scoutsuite_results_<name>.js` files disclose AWS, Azure and GCP IAM principals, resource inventories, misconfigurations and findings. Report names derive from caller-selected names with predictable defaults. During an admin- or analyst-initiated GCP scan, `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/routes/scoutsuite.py` saves the uploaded Google service-account JSON key into that same web-served directory. In `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/services/scoutsuite.py`, `generate_gcp_report_background` removes the key only after the scan finishes. Any anonymous client that can reach the host and request the file path can therefore retrieve the private key during the scan and use the service account's cloud permissions, as well as read retained cloud-security reports. Credential isolation is released in version 0.1.77; a release fully remediating the report-disclosure component has not been established.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/30/2026
The vulnerability identified in SOCFortress CoPilot represents a critical failure in access control and credential management within its security operations platform. The core issue stems from an improperly configured static file mount point for the `/scoutsuite-report` directory located at `backend/copilot.py`. While standard API routes are protected by JSON Web Token authentication, this specific endpoint remains unauthenticated, allowing any anonymous client with network access to the host to retrieve files stored within that directory. This architectural flaw creates a direct path for unauthorized data exfiltration and credential theft, undermining the fundamental security posture of the application which is designed to centralize sensitive cloud security operations.
The technical exploitation involves two distinct but related attack vectors enabled by this misconfiguration. First, an attacker can access generated HTML reports and JavaScript files containing detailed scans of AWS, Azure, and GCP environments. These disclosures include IAM principals, resource inventories, identified misconfigurations, and specific findings, providing a comprehensive map of the target's cloud infrastructure to any adversary. Second, during administrative or analyst-initiated Google Cloud Platform scans, the system temporarily stores uploaded service account JSON keys in this same web-served directory via `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/routes/scoutsuite.py`. Although the background task responsible for generating reports eventually removes these keys after completion, there is a significant time window where the private key remains accessible. An attacker monitoring or timing their requests can intercept and download these service account credentials before they are deleted by `generate_gcp_report_background` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/services/scoutsuite.py`.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it allows for both reconnaissance and active compromise of cloud infrastructure. By retrieving the retained cloud security reports, an attacker gains deep visibility into organizational assets and potential weaknesses without needing valid credentials. More critically, obtaining a Google service account JSON key grants the attacker full permissions associated with that service account within GCP. This can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, lateral movement across cloud resources, privilege escalation, or even complete compromise of the affected cloud project. The predictability of report names further facilitates automated scanning and exploitation by adversaries seeking these artifacts.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor and CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials in terms of improper handling of sensitive data, as well as ATT&CK technique T1530: Data from Cloud Storage Object for exfiltration. The failure to isolate credentials from publicly accessible web paths violates basic principles of secure software design regarding the separation of concerns and least privilege access. Remediation efforts have begun with version 0.1.77, which addresses credential isolation by ensuring service account keys are not stored in web-served directories during processing. However, a complete remediation for the report disclosure component has not yet been established, leaving organizations vulnerable to information leakage through exposed reports until further updates are released. Organizations should immediately restrict network access to this endpoint if possible and monitor logs for unauthorized requests to the `/scoutsuite-report` path while awaiting official patches that fully close both the credential exposure and report disclosure gaps.