CVE-2026-119711 in PipesHub
Summary
by MITRE • 10/30/2026
PipesHub before 0.10.0 contains a rate limit bypass vulnerability in getClientIp() that allows unauthenticated attackers to evade per-IP throttling by spoofing X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP headers. Attackers can rotate header values to obtain fresh rate-limit buckets on authentication endpoints, enabling password spraying and OTP or password-reset email flooding.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/30/2026
The vulnerability identified in PipesHub versions prior to 0.10.0 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms, specifically within the getClientIp() function responsible for determining the source address of incoming requests. This flaw allows unauthenticated actors to bypass per-IP rate limiting controls by manipulating HTTP headers such as X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP. In modern web architectures that utilize reverse proxies or load balancers, these headers are commonly used to preserve the original client IP address when traffic passes through intermediate nodes. However, PipesHub incorrectly trusts these header values without sufficient validation against trusted proxy configurations or internal network boundaries. This misconfiguration enables attackers to spoof their apparent source identity by rotating header values with different arbitrary IP addresses for each request sent to authentication endpoints.
From a technical perspective, the core issue lies in the application's logic for extracting and validating client identifiers. Instead of relying on the direct connection address provided by the underlying web server or framework, which is significantly harder to spoof without network-level access, the software prioritizes user-supplied header data. By allowing unauthenticated users to inject arbitrary IP addresses into these headers, the rate-limiting subsystem perceives each request as originating from a unique client. Consequently, the throttling mechanism resets its counters for every new spoofed address, effectively nullifying the protective barrier intended to prevent brute-force attacks and automated abuse. This bypass is particularly dangerous because it operates at the application layer, requiring no special network privileges or exploitation of underlying infrastructure vulnerabilities beyond standard HTTP request manipulation capabilities available through common scripting tools or browser extensions.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, primarily facilitating large-scale credential stuffing and password spraying campaigns against user accounts. Since attackers can generate an effectively infinite number of unique IP addresses, they are not constrained by the typical limits that restrict login attempts per minute or hour. This capability allows for exhaustive dictionary attacks where millions of common passwords can be tested across numerous usernames without triggering account lockouts or CAPTCHA challenges designed to deter automated traffic. Furthermore, the vulnerability extends beyond authentication endpoints to include password reset and one-time passcode (OTP) delivery mechanisms. Attackers can exploit this flaw to flood specific email addresses with reset links or OTP codes, leading to denial of service conditions for legitimate users through inbox exhaustion. This abuse also increases operational costs associated with email services and degrades the overall user experience by generating significant noise in communication channels.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials if viewed broadly as a failure in authentication logic, but more accurately maps to CWE-304: Missing Critical Step in Authentication or CWE-613: Insufficient Session Expiration when considering the session management aspects, though its primary classification is under CWE-285: Improper Authorization. In terms of offensive security frameworks, this behavior corresponds directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1110.004: Password Spraying, where attackers attempt common passwords against many accounts to avoid detection by lockout policies. It also relates to T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application and potentially T1568.002: Dynamic Resolution if the attacker uses dynamic DNS services to rotate IP addresses further. The lack of proper input validation on headers is a classic example of CWE-20: Improper Input Validation, where trusted data sources are assumed without verification.
Mitigation strategies must focus on correcting how client identity is determined and enforcing strict rate-limiting logic that cannot be trivially bypassed via header manipulation. Developers should configure the application to trust only specific proxy IP ranges defined in a whitelist, ensuring that X-Forwarded-For headers originate from known infrastructure components rather than end-users. Alternatively, relying solely on the remote address provided by the web server's connection object is often more secure for applications behind reverse proxies if configured correctly with modern frameworks like Express.js or Django which have built-in trust proxy settings. Additionally implementing CAPTCHA challenges after a small number of failed attempts regardless of IP rotation can mitigate automated spraying attacks. Rate limiting should also be applied based on additional factors such as user agent strings, session cookies where applicable, or behavioral analysis metrics to create a multi-dimensional defense layer that is resistant to simple header spoofing.