CVE-2026-119708 in abp-next-admin
Summary
by MITRE • 10/30/2026
abp-next-admin 10.4.0 through 10.7.0 contains a cross-tenant authorization bypass in the BlobManagement download-by-name endpoint, letting authenticated users read other tenants' files. Attackers supply a victim tenantId in the request path, causing DownloadByNameAsync to switch tenant context and return blobs stored by that tenant.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/30/2026
The vulnerability identified in abp-next-admin versions 10.4.0 through 10.7.0 represents a critical failure in multi-tenant isolation mechanisms within the BlobManagement service. Specifically, this flaw resides in the download-by-name endpoint, which is designed to retrieve files stored by authenticated users based on their assigned tenant context. In a properly secured multi-tenant architecture, each user's access requests must be strictly bound to their specific tenant identifier to prevent data leakage across organizational boundaries. However, the implementation of the DownloadByNameAsync method fails to enforce this boundary correctly when processing incoming HTTP requests that include an explicit tenantId parameter in the request path.
The technical root cause lies in how the application handles the tenant context during file retrieval operations. When a user submits a download request containing a victim's tenantId within the URL structure, the backend logic erroneously accepts and processes this external input as the authoritative source for determining which tenant's data should be accessed. Instead of relying solely on the authenticated session's inherent tenant assignment or validating that the requested resource belongs to the current user's organization, the system switches its operational context to match the supplied tenantId. This behavior effectively allows an attacker who has valid authentication credentials for their own account to manipulate the request parameters and impersonate a different tenant during the file access operation.
From an operational impact perspective, this cross-tenant authorization bypass results in severe confidentiality breaches. Authenticated attackers can read, download, or exfiltrate sensitive files stored by other tenants within the same instance of abp-next-admin. Since blob storage often contains proprietary documents, personal identifiable information, or confidential business records, the ability to access these resources without proper authorization constitutes a significant data breach. The vulnerability affects all users who have authenticated access to the system and can craft requests with arbitrary tenant identifiers, making it exploitable by any registered user regardless of their internal role or permissions within their own organization.
This flaw aligns closely with CWE-284 Improper Access Control, specifically illustrating a failure in enforcing proper authorization checks for multi-tenant environments where context switching is mishandled. It also maps to the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1530 Data from Cloud Storage Object, as it involves unauthorized access and exfiltration of data stored in cloud-based blob storage systems. The vulnerability highlights the importance of ensuring that tenant identifiers derived from request parameters are never used directly for authorization decisions without rigorous validation against the authenticated user's actual permissions and assigned tenant context.
To mitigate this risk, developers must implement strict input validation on all tenant-related parameters received via HTTP requests. The system should ignore any tenantId provided in the URL path or query string if it conflicts with the tenant identity established during authentication. Instead, access control decisions for blob retrieval operations must be based exclusively on the authenticated session's context and explicit ownership checks of the requested resource. Additionally, implementing comprehensive logging and monitoring for unusual patterns of cross-tenant data access can help detect potential exploitation attempts in real-time. Upgrading to a patched version that corrects this logic error is essential for restoring proper multi-tenant isolation and preventing unauthorized data exposure.