CVE-2026-107057 in AndBible
Summary
by MITRE • 10/29/2026
An issue in AndBible versionCode 1111 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via uploading a crafted module zip.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/29/2026
The vulnerability identified in AndBible, specifically affecting the application build with version code 1111, represents a critical security flaw rooted in improper handling of archive files during the module installation process. This issue falls under the category of Improper Restriction of Excessive Functionality within Vulnerable Components, commonly referenced as CWE-732. The core technical failure lies in the application's lack of rigorous validation and sanitization mechanisms for zip archives submitted by users or downloaded from external sources. When a user attempts to install a custom module, which is packaged as a compressed zip file, the software extracts its contents without sufficiently verifying the integrity, origin, or nature of the files contained within the archive. This permissive approach allows an attacker to craft a malicious zip file that contains executable scripts, dynamic libraries, or other payloads disguised as legitimate module components such as images, text files, or configuration data.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability enables arbitrary code execution because the application likely executes certain extracted files directly or loads them into memory for processing without checking their content type against expected formats. For instance, if the application processes JavaScript engines to render HTML-based modules or uses native libraries for performance optimization, an attacker can embed malicious code in these interpretable formats within the zip file. Upon extraction and subsequent execution by the app's runtime environment, this embedded code gains the same privileges as the AndBible application itself. This effectively bypasses standard security boundaries because mobile applications often operate with significant permissions related to storage access, network connectivity, or even device-specific features depending on their configuration. The attacker does not need elevated system privileges; they only require the victim user to install the malicious module through the app's official interface, leveraging social engineering tactics such as distributing fake modules via forums, email, or compromised websites.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly given the sensitive nature of Bible study applications which may store personal notes, bookmarks, and reading habits that users consider private. Successful exploitation allows an attacker to achieve remote code execution on the victim's Android device with the context of the AndBible application. This can lead to data exfiltration where sensitive textual annotations or user preferences are stolen and transmitted to a command-and-control server. Furthermore, the compromised app instance could be used as a foothold for further lateral movement within the device ecosystem if additional vulnerabilities exist in other installed applications sharing similar permissions. In worst-case scenarios, persistent backdoors can be established by modifying application resources or injecting malicious code into shared storage directories accessible by other apps, potentially leading to broader system compromise depending on Android version and security patches applied.
This attack vector aligns with the MITRE ATT&CK framework technique T1059, specifically Command and Scripting Interpreter, as it involves executing scripts embedded within a seemingly benign file format. It also relates to T1204, User Execution, since the victim must actively participate by installing the module. To mitigate this risk, developers of AndBible should implement strict input validation for all uploaded or downloaded zip files. This includes verifying that extracted filenames do not contain path traversal sequences like dot-dot-slash and ensuring that only expected file extensions are processed. Additionally, implementing a sandboxed environment for executing any dynamic content within modules is crucial to prevent direct access to the host application's sensitive resources. Code signing of module packages can also be introduced to verify their authenticity before installation. Users should be advised to install modules only from trusted sources and keep their applications updated with the latest security patches that address these input validation flaws. Regular security audits focusing on archive handling logic are recommended to prevent similar vulnerabilities in future releases.