CVE-2026-119650 in HuLa-Server
Summary
by MITRE • 10/30/2026
HuLa-Server through 3.0.7 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in PrivacyController that allows authenticated users to access other users' privacy settings by supplying their uid. Attackers can send GET or POST requests to /privacy with a target uid parameter to read and overwrite that user's UserPrivacy settings without ownership checks.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/30/2026
The HuLa-Server software, specifically versions up through 3.0.7, suffers from an insecure direct object reference vulnerability within its PrivacyController component. This flaw stems from the application logic failing to perform adequate authorization checks when processing requests related to user privacy settings. The core technical deficiency lies in the controller's reliance on a target uid parameter supplied by the client without verifying that this identifier corresponds to the authenticated session of the requesting user. Consequently, any validly authenticated user can manipulate the uid field within GET or POST requests directed at the /privacy endpoint to reference arbitrary user accounts. This lack of ownership verification allows an attacker to bypass intended access controls and interact with privacy configurations belonging to other system users.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability is classified under CWE-639, which denotes Insecure Direct Object References. The attack vector involves sending HTTP requests where the uid parameter is modified to point to different user identifiers within the database or backend storage. Because the server processes these requests based solely on the provided identifier rather than cross-referencing it against the authenticated identity of the requester, the application effectively exposes private data and allows for unauthorized state changes. This represents a fundamental failure in implementing proper access control mechanisms at the object level, where the system assumes that possession of a valid session token grants permission to act upon any resource identified by an ID provided in the request payload.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant regarding both confidentiality and integrity within the HuLa-Server environment. Attackers can read sensitive privacy settings associated with other users, potentially exposing personal preferences, communication restrictions, or visibility configurations that were intended to remain private. Furthermore, the ability to overwrite these settings means an attacker could alter a victim's privacy configuration, such as disabling message filtering, changing contact permissions, or modifying notification preferences. This not only compromises user trust but can also facilitate further social engineering attacks by manipulating how users interact with one another on the platform. The vulnerability affects all authenticated users, meaning that any compromised account or malicious insider could exploit this flaw to target other members of the system without requiring elevated privileges beyond standard authentication.
In terms of threat modeling and industry standards, this behavior aligns closely with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, specifically Valid Accounts, as it leverages legitimate credentials to perform unauthorized actions against resources not owned by that account. It also reflects aspects of T1530, Data from Cloud Storage, if the privacy settings are considered stored data accessible via API endpoints. The exploitation does not require complex injection techniques or buffer overflows; instead, it relies on simple parameter tampering, making it easy to discover and exploit using automated tools or manual testing with standard web proxies.
To mitigate this vulnerability, developers must implement strict object-level access control checks within the PrivacyController. Every request that accesses or modifies user-specific data should verify that the uid in the request matches the uid associated with the authenticated session token. This can be achieved by retrieving the current user's identity from the security context and comparing it against the target resource identifier before processing any logic related to privacy settings. Additionally, implementing a centralized authorization service that validates permissions for each action is recommended over ad-hoc checks within individual controllers. For users of HuLa-Server 3.0.7 and earlier versions, upgrading to a patched release where this flaw has been resolved is the primary remediation strategy until such an update becomes available.