CVE-2026-110193 in Langflow OSS
Summary
by MITRE • 10/29/2026
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.12.8 could allow a remote attacker with a low-privileged authenticated account to cause the Agentic Assistant to generate or submit component code using these unblocked patterns, resulting in arbitrary operating system command execution on the server.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/29/2026
The vulnerability identified in IBM Langflow versions 1.0.0 through 1.12.8 represents a critical security flaw within its agentic assistant framework, specifically affecting how user-supplied inputs are processed for code generation and submission. This issue stems from an insufficient validation mechanism that fails to adequately sanitize or restrict the patterns used when generating component code. As a result, an attacker who possesses even low-privileged authenticated credentials can manipulate the system into executing arbitrary operating system commands on the underlying server infrastructure. The core technical flaw lies in the application's failure to enforce strict allow-listing of safe operations while simultaneously blocking dangerous command injection vectors during the dynamic generation and execution phases of component code.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability is classified under CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, commonly known as OS Command Injection. The agentic assistant feature allows users to define components that interact with external systems or perform computational tasks. When the system generates code based on user input, it inadvertently includes unblocked patterns that permit shell metacharacters or command chaining sequences. These sequences allow the attacker to break out of the intended context and inject additional commands into the operating system's interpreter. Because this process occurs server-side during component execution, the impact is not limited to client-side script injection but extends directly to backend infrastructure compromise.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its potential for remote code execution with elevated privileges relative to the application user context. An attacker leveraging low-privileged authenticated access can escalate their influence by executing arbitrary commands such as reading sensitive configuration files, exfiltrating data from connected databases, or pivoting further into the internal network. This undermines the fundamental security principle of least privilege, as even minimal account permissions are sufficient to trigger a full system compromise. The ability to submit component code using unblocked patterns effectively bypasses authentication and authorization controls that would otherwise restrict access to administrative functions or sensitive data stores.
This vulnerability aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, specifically the sub-technique for shell commands like sh or bash. The attack vector involves the attacker crafting specific inputs that are interpreted as executable code by the server's runtime environment. This behavior is particularly dangerous in cloud-native environments where Langflow might be deployed with access to container orchestration APIs or internal service meshes. Compromise of these systems could lead to broader infrastructure instability, data breaches involving personally identifiable information or intellectual property, and significant regulatory compliance violations under frameworks such as GDPR or HIPAA depending on the data processed by the compromised instance.
Mitigation strategies must focus on immediate remediation through software updates followed by robust architectural hardening. The primary defense is upgrading IBM Langflow to a version beyond 1.12.8 where these unblocked patterns have been identified and neutralized by the vendor. In environments where patching is not immediately feasible, network segmentation should be implemented to restrict outbound connections from the server hosting Langflow to only necessary endpoints. Additionally, implementing strict input validation at the API gateway level can help filter out malicious payloads before they reach the application logic. Deploying a Web Application Firewall with rules specifically tuned for OS command injection patterns provides an additional layer of defense against exploitation attempts.
Long-term resilience requires adopting secure coding practices that prioritize safe execution contexts. Developers should avoid using system-level shell interpreters to execute dynamic code and instead utilize sandboxed environments or restricted APIs that limit the scope of allowable operations. Implementing a strict allow-list approach for all user-supplied parameters ensures that only predefined, verified values are processed by the agentic assistant. Regular security audits and static application security testing should be integrated into the development lifecycle to detect similar vulnerabilities before deployment. Monitoring server logs for unusual command execution patterns can also aid in early detection of attempted exploitation activities.