CVE-2026-107046 in FocusPodcast
Summary
by MITRE • 10/29/2026
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in the url/title/author/coverUrl component of FocusPodcast versionCode 70allows attackers to scan internal resources via supplying a crafted URL.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/29/2026
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2019-5648 represents a critical Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw within the FocusPodcast application, specifically affecting versions with code 70 and earlier. SSRF is a severe class of web security vulnerabilities that allows an attacker to induce the server-side application to make HTTP requests to arbitrary domains or internal network resources. In this specific instance, the vulnerability resides in multiple input fields including url, title, author, and coverUrl. These components are typically used by users to define metadata for podcast episodes or content entries. The core technical failure lies in the lack of proper validation and sanitization of user-supplied URLs before they are processed by the backend server. When a malicious actor provides a crafted URL pointing towards an internal IP address or localhost, the application blindly forwards this request without verifying whether the destination is external or part of the protected internal network infrastructure.
From a technical perspective, the exploitation mechanism relies on the trust relationship between the client and the server. The application acts as a proxy for these requests, fetching content from the specified URL to display it within the app interface. Because the backend does not enforce strict allow-lists for permitted domains or block private IP ranges such as 10.x.x.x, 172.16.x.x through 172.31.x.x, and 192.168.x.x, attackers can manipulate these parameters to target internal services that are not directly exposed to the public internet. This capability effectively bypasses network perimeter defenses like firewalls, as the requests originate from a trusted internal server rather than an external attacker's machine. The impact of this flaw extends beyond simple information disclosure; it enables comprehensive internal network scanning and reconnaissance. Attackers can probe for open ports, identify running services such as databases, administrative panels, or cloud metadata endpoints, and potentially chain these findings with other vulnerabilities to achieve remote code execution or full system compromise.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-918, which defines Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaws where a web application fetches a remote resource without validating the user-supplied URL. Furthermore, in terms of offensive security frameworks, this exploit maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1046, Network Service Discovery. By leveraging SSRF for internal scanning, attackers are performing active reconnaissance against their target's infrastructure. The ability to scan internal resources significantly escalates the risk profile from a minor data exposure issue to a critical threat that can lead to lateral movement within the network environment. For mobile applications like FocusPodcast, this is particularly dangerous because they often run on devices with persistent connections and may have access to sensitive local storage or credentials stored in shared preferences if further exploitation occurs.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must focus on rigorous input validation and secure coding practices. Developers should implement a strict allow-list approach for all URLs processed by the application, permitting only known safe domains rather than attempting to block malicious patterns which are easily evaded through encoding techniques or protocol variations such as HTTP redirects to internal IPs. Additionally, implementing network-level controls is essential; this includes configuring firewalls and proxy servers to prevent outbound connections from the application server to private IP ranges unless explicitly required for business logic. It is also recommended to disable unnecessary protocols like FTP or Gopher that are often used in SSRF attacks to interact with various services. For users of FocusPodcast version 70, immediate action involves updating to a patched version where these input fields have been secured against arbitrary URL resolution. Until an update is available, restricting the application's network permissions at the operating system level can provide a temporary layer of defense by preventing it from making outbound connections to internal subnets.