CVE-2026-101064 in Obot
Summary
by MITRE • 09/28/2026
Obot before v0.23.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in remote MCP server registration that allows privileged users to specify arbitrary URLs without destination validation. Attackers with Power User or higher roles can coerce Obot to make requests to internal services and cloud metadata endpoints, reading responses in error messages to disclose sensitive credentials.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/28/2026
The identified security flaw resides within the remote Model Context Protocol server registration functionality of Obot versions prior to 0.23.0. This vulnerability constitutes a classic Server-Side Request Forgery scenario where the application fails to perform adequate validation or sanitization on user-supplied input when registering external servers. Specifically, the system allows authenticated users with Power User privileges or higher roles to specify arbitrary Uniform Resource Locators without verifying the destination against an allowlist or checking for internal network ranges. This lack of restriction enables attackers to manipulate the server into initiating HTTP requests to destinations that are not intended to be accessible by end-users, effectively bypassing standard perimeter security controls and network segmentation strategies.
From a technical perspective, the core issue is rooted in insufficient input validation during the configuration phase of remote MCP servers. When an administrator or power user submits a URL for registration, the backend processes this value directly without implementing checks such as DNS rebinding protection, IP address filtering, or protocol restriction to safe schemes like HTTPS only. This oversight allows the application logic to resolve and connect to internal service endpoints that are typically isolated from external access. By leveraging these internal addresses, an attacker can interact with services running on localhost, private subnets, or cloud provider metadata interfaces, which often contain sensitive configuration data and authentication tokens necessary for further exploitation of the infrastructure.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant due to the privilege level required for exploitation. While it requires a Power User role or higher, such privileges are commonly held by developers, DevOps engineers, and system administrators who manage integration workflows. Once exploited, an attacker can coerce Obot into making requests to cloud metadata endpoints, which frequently expose instance identity documents, temporary security credentials, and other sensitive configuration details. These responses may be reflected back in error messages generated during the registration process or subsequent interactions with the maliciously configured server. This mechanism facilitates credential theft and information disclosure, potentially leading to full compromise of associated cloud resources or internal services that rely on these exposed secrets for authentication and authorization.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), which describes flaws where a web application fetches a remote resource without validating the user-supplied URL. Additionally, it maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle, as the attacker uses Obot as an intermediary to intercept or manipulate communications between internal services and external entities. The ability to read responses in error messages further correlates with CWE-209 Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information, which exacerbates the risk by providing a direct channel for data exfiltration without requiring complex out-of-band techniques.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations running Obot versions earlier than 0.23.0 should immediately upgrade to the latest stable release where these input validation controls have been implemented. In cases where upgrading is not immediately feasible, administrators can implement network-level mitigations such as firewall rules or reverse proxy configurations that block outbound connections from the Obot service account to internal IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints like 169.254.169.254 for AWS or similar addresses for other providers. Furthermore, enforcing strict allowlists for registered remote server URLs during the registration process can prevent unauthorized destinations while maintaining necessary operational functionality. Regular auditing of user roles and permissions is also recommended to ensure that only trusted individuals retain Power User access, thereby reducing the attack surface available to potential insiders or compromised accounts.