CVE-2026-102456 in EasyFlow
Summary
by MITRE • 09/30/2026
EasyFlow .NET developed by Digiwin has an SQL Injection vulnerability. Authenticated remote attackers can inject arbitrary SQL commands to read database contents.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/30/2026
The identified security flaw resides within EasyFlow.NET, a workflow automation platform developed by Digiwin Software Limited. This software is widely utilized in enterprise environments for managing business processes and document workflows. The specific vulnerability classified as an SQL injection allows authenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary Structured Query Language commands against the underlying database management system. Unlike unauthenticated attacks that target exposed endpoints without credentials, this particular weakness requires the attacker to first establish a valid session within the application. This prerequisite significantly narrows the attack surface but does not eliminate the risk, as insider threats or compromised user accounts can easily leverage these elevated privileges to cause severe damage.
The technical nature of this vulnerability stems from improper neutralization of special elements used in SQL commands within one or more inputs processed by the software. When a user submits data through an authenticated interface, such as modifying workflow parameters, viewing reports, or updating profile settings, the application constructs database queries using string concatenation rather than parameterized queries or prepared statements. This failure to properly sanitize input allows an attacker to inject malicious SQL syntax that alters the logic of the original query. By manipulating these inputs, an adversary can bypass intended access controls and interact directly with the backend data store, effectively treating the application as a thin client for direct database manipulation rather than enforcing strict business logic boundaries.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is profound, primarily centering on the compromise of data integrity and confidentiality. Since SQL injection provides a mechanism to read arbitrary database contents, attackers can extract sensitive information such as user credentials, personal identifiable information, financial records, or proprietary workflow configurations stored within the EasyFlow.NET database. Beyond simple data exfiltration, skilled adversaries may utilize advanced techniques like blind SQL injection or time-based attacks to enumerate database schema details even when error messages are suppressed by default application settings. In severe cases, if the underlying database service account possesses high-level privileges such as xp_cmdshell access in Microsoft SQL Server environments, this vulnerability could potentially be chained with other exploits to achieve remote code execution on the host server, leading to a complete system compromise and loss of availability for critical business operations.
From a classification perspective, this issue aligns directly with Common Weakness Enumeration identifier CWE-89, which describes Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command. This categorization highlights the fundamental coding error where user-controllable input is incorporated into database queries without adequate validation or encoding. Furthermore, within the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this vulnerability facilitates several tactics including Credential Access through T1078 Valid Accounts and Data Exfiltration via T1530 from Remote Data Stores. The requirement for authentication places this attack vector in the realm of post-compromise activities where an attacker leverages existing access to pivot deeper into the network infrastructure or extract valuable intellectual property, making it a critical concern for organizations relying on Digiwin’s workflow solutions.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary technical fix involves refactoring all database interaction code within EasyFlow.NET to utilize parameterized queries or stored procedures with bound parameters instead of dynamic string concatenation. This ensures that user input is treated strictly as data rather than executable code, neutralizing the injection attempt regardless of its content. Additionally, organizations should implement strict input validation policies on both client and server sides, enforcing whitelists for expected character sets and lengths to reject malformed requests early in the request lifecycle. Deploying a Web Application Firewall can provide an additional layer of defense by detecting and blocking known SQL injection patterns before they reach the application logic, although this is considered a compensating control rather than a definitive fix.
Beyond code-level fixes, administrative controls play a crucial role in minimizing risk exposure. Database accounts used by the EasyFlow.NET application should adhere to the principle of least privilege, ensuring that the service account has only the minimum permissions necessary for its function and does not possess elevated rights such as sysadmin or db_owner roles unless absolutely required. Regular security audits and penetration testing focused on authenticated workflows can help identify similar vulnerabilities in other modules before they are exploited. Keeping EasyFlow.NET updated to the latest version provided by Digiwin is essential, as vendors typically release patches that address known SQL injection flaws once identified through responsible disclosure processes or internal quality assurance reviews.