CVE-2026-102455 in EasyFlow
Summary
by MITRE • 09/30/2026
EasyFlow .NET developed by Digiwin has a Insecure Deserialization vulnerability. Unauthenticated remote attackers can execute arbitrary code on the server by sending maliciously crafted serialized content.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/30/2026
The discovery of an insecure deserialization vulnerability in EasyFlow.NET, a workflow automation platform developed by Digiwin Software, represents a critical security risk that allows for unauthenticated remote code execution. This flaw stems from the application's handling of user-supplied data during the process of converting serialized objects back into their native memory structures. In many .NET-based applications, deserialization is used to reconstruct complex object graphs from byte streams or text formats such as JSON, XML, or binary serializers like BinaryFormatter. When an application fails to validate the integrity and type of these incoming payloads before processing them, it creates a pathway for attackers to inject malicious objects that exploit internal logic flaws within the target framework.
The technical mechanism behind this vulnerability relies on the fact that certain deserialization libraries in .NET automatically invoke constructors or property setters during the reconstruction process. If an attacker can control the serialized data sent to the application, they can craft a payload containing a gadget chain—a sequence of legitimate classes and methods available within the application's dependencies—that performs unintended actions when instantiated. In this specific case, the lack of input validation allows unauthenticated users to send specially crafted requests that trigger these dangerous code paths without requiring any form of authentication or session token. This bypasses standard access controls entirely, granting the attacker a foothold on the server with the privileges under which the EasyFlow.NET service is running.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and potentially catastrophic for organizations relying on Digiwin's workflow solutions. Successful exploitation enables remote code execution (RCE), allowing attackers to install backdoors, exfiltrate sensitive business data stored within the workflow system, pivot further into the internal network, or disrupt service availability by crashing the application process. Since EasyFlow.NET is often deployed in enterprise environments handling critical business processes, a compromise could lead to significant financial loss, regulatory non-compliance due to data breaches, and reputational damage. The unauthenticated nature of the exploit means that any internet-facing instance of this software with default or misconfigured settings is immediately vulnerable to automated scanning tools commonly used by threat actors seeking easy entry points into corporate networks.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-502, which describes Deserialization of Untrusted Data, a category of flaws where an application deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid. Furthermore, from a tactical perspective related to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this exploit maps directly to T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter if the attacker uses scripts for post-exploitation, or more broadly to Initial Access techniques involving exploitation of application vulnerabilities. The ability to execute arbitrary code remotely places this flaw in the highest severity tier, necessitating immediate remediation efforts.
Mitigation strategies must focus on eliminating the root cause by avoiding insecure deserialization practices altogether where possible. Developers should replace legacy serializers like BinaryFormatter with safer alternatives such as JSON.NET or System.Text.Json that do not support polymorphic type instantiation by default. If custom serialization is required, strict allow-listing of expected types and classes should be implemented to ensure only known-safe objects are processed. Additionally, implementing input validation checks on all serialized data before deserialization can help detect malformed payloads. For immediate risk reduction in production environments where patching may take time, network-level controls such as Web Application Firewalls (WAF) with rules specifically designed to block common .NET serialization patterns or gadget chain signatures should be deployed. Regular security audits and static code analysis tools configured to flag insecure deserialization calls are also essential for long-term resilience against this class of vulnerabilities.