CVE-2026-103007 in Elasticsearch
Summary
by MITRE • 10/06/2026
Incorrect Authorization (CWE-863) in Elasticsearch can lead to Privilege Escalation via a delegated administrative privilege whose scope is not fully enforced during authorization checks. Elasticsearch contains an incorrect authorization weakness in a configurable, non-default privilege that lets an administrator delegate limited role-management capability to another user, scoped to specific indices. The authorization check that enforces this scoping does not correctly account for a role-definition setting that can expand the matched index set. A user holding this delegated privilege with a broadly-scoped index pattern can exploit this inconsistency by updating their own assigned role to gain access to indices that should remain restricted, including internal security data. This can enable further escalation up to full administrative control of the cluster.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/08/2026
Elasticsearch contains an incorrect authorization weakness classified under CWE-863, which allows for privilege escalation through a specific delegation mechanism designed for role management. The vulnerability stems from how Elasticsearch handles scoped privileges when administrators delegate limited role-management capabilities to other users. While this feature is intended to restrict delegated actions to specific indices, the enforcement logic fails to correctly account for certain role-definition settings that can expand the set of matched indices beyond what was originally authorized. This discrepancy creates a gap between the intended security policy and its actual implementation during authorization checks.
The technical flaw occurs when a user holds this delegated privilege with an index pattern that is broadly scoped or configured in a way that interacts poorly with internal role definitions. By exploiting this inconsistency, an attacker can update their own assigned role to effectively bypass the scoping restrictions. This manipulation allows access to indices that should remain strictly restricted, including critical internal security data such as user credentials and permission mappings. The core issue lies in the authorization engine's failure to validate whether changes to a role definition inadvertently broaden the index scope beyond the permissions granted by the delegation privilege.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, enabling an attacker with limited delegated privileges to escalate their rights significantly. Once access to internal security data is obtained, the attacker can manipulate user accounts and roles further, potentially leading to full administrative control over the Elasticsearch cluster. This level of compromise allows for unauthorized reading or modification of all data within the cluster, as well as potential disruption of service through configuration changes. The ability to escalate privileges in this manner undermines the fundamental principle of least privilege that organizations rely on when configuring multi-tenant environments or delegating operational tasks.
From a threat intelligence perspective, this vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK techniques related to Privilege Escalation and Defense Evasion, specifically involving manipulation of access control mechanisms. Attackers can leverage this flaw to move laterally within the infrastructure by gaining higher-level credentials without needing initial high-privilege accounts. This is particularly dangerous in environments where Elasticsearch serves as a central logging or security information management system, as compromising it provides visibility into other systems and potential entry points for further attacks.
Mitigation strategies should focus on applying vendor-provided patches that address the authorization check logic to ensure index scoping is strictly enforced regardless of role definition settings. Organizations using this feature must review their delegation configurations to minimize broad index patterns where possible, adhering to strict least-privilege principles even within delegated roles. Regular audits of user permissions and role assignments are essential to detect any unauthorized modifications that might indicate exploitation attempts. Additionally, monitoring for unusual changes in security-related indices can help identify potential privilege escalation activities before they result in full cluster compromise.