CVE-2026-105048 in Attu
Summary
by MITRE • 10/03/2026
The Playground feature of Zilliz Attu before 3.0.0 allows SSRF (proxying of requests to private IP addresses).
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/03/2026
Zilliz Attu, a management interface for the Milvus vector database, contained a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in its Playground feature prior to version 3.0.0. This security flaw stems from insufficient validation of user-supplied input when constructing outbound HTTP requests. The application allows users to specify target URLs or endpoints within the Playground environment, which is designed for testing and querying vector data. However, the underlying implementation fails to restrict these targets to a predefined allowlist of public domains or properly sanitizes inputs that could resolve to private IP address ranges. This lack of input validation enables an attacker to manipulate the request destination, effectively turning the application into a proxy for arbitrary network requests initiated from the server hosting Attu.
The technical nature of this vulnerability aligns with CWE-918, which classifies Server-Side Request Forgery flaws where web applications fetch remote resources without validating user-supplied URLs. In the context of Zilliz Attu, an authenticated attacker or any individual with access to the Playground interface can craft a malicious request that directs the server to connect to internal network services. By specifying private IP addresses such as those in the 10.x.x.x, 172.16-31.x.x, or 192.168.x.x ranges, an attacker can probe internal infrastructure components that are not directly exposed to the internet. This capability bypasses perimeter firewalls and network segmentation strategies because the traffic originates from a trusted internal host rather than an external source.
The operational impact of this SSRF vulnerability is significant, particularly in environments where Zilliz Attu is deployed within private networks or cloud VPCs with strict security boundaries. An attacker can leverage this flaw to perform port scanning against internal services, exploit vulnerabilities on backend systems such as databases, message queues, or other microservices running on non-standard ports, and potentially access sensitive administrative interfaces like Kubernetes dashboards or monitoring tools. In more severe scenarios, if the server has cloud metadata service credentials accessible via local endpoints, the attacker could retrieve IAM roles and instance profiles to escalate privileges further within the cloud environment. This effectively compromises the confidentiality and integrity of internal assets that rely on network isolation for protection.
From a threat modeling perspective, this vulnerability facilitates reconnaissance and lateral movement phases as defined by the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Specifically, it relates to T1598, which covers Phishing for Inbound Trust, or more accurately in this context, T1046 Network Service Discovery if used for scanning, and potentially T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services if internal services are vulnerable. The ability to proxy requests allows the attacker to interact with services that would otherwise be unreachable from their initial point of entry, thereby expanding the attack surface significantly beyond what is visible through standard external penetration testing methods.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations running versions of Zilliz Attu prior to 3.0.0 should upgrade immediately to version 3.0.0 or later, where the developers have implemented proper input validation and URL allowlisting mechanisms for the Playground feature. For environments that cannot be upgraded immediately due to compatibility constraints, network-level controls are recommended as a compensating measure. This includes configuring firewalls or reverse proxies to block outbound connections from the Attu server to private IP address ranges unless explicitly required by business logic. Additionally, implementing strict egress filtering rules and ensuring that internal services do not rely solely on network isolation for security can reduce the risk of exploitation. Regular auditing of application logs for unusual outbound connection patterns can also aid in early detection of potential abuse attempts targeting this specific flaw.