CVE-2026-107026 in Share to Clipboard
Summary
by MITRE • 10/29/2026
Insecure permissions in Share to Clipboard v1.14.1 (versionCode 32) allows unauthorized attackers to arbitrarily overwrite another user's clipboard content.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/29/2026
The vulnerability identified in Share to Clipboard version 1.14.1, corresponding to application package identifier with version code thirty-two, represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms within the mobile operating system environment. This flaw stems from an insecure configuration of file permissions or shared storage contexts that govern how clipboard data is managed and persisted by the application. In modern Android ecosystems, applications often utilize intermediate files or specific content providers to facilitate cross-application data transfer via the system clipboard service. When these underlying resources are assigned overly permissive access rights, such as world-readable and writable flags rather than private user-only restrictions, it creates a direct pathway for malicious actors to intercept and manipulate sensitive information that is not intended for public consumption.
From a technical perspective, this issue classifies under CWE-732 which pertains to incorrect permission assignment for critical resources. The application fails to enforce strict isolation between its internal clipboard handling mechanisms and other processes running on the device. By allowing arbitrary write access to the storage location where clipboard payloads are temporarily held or permanently stored, the software effectively bypasses standard sandboxing protections. An attacker who has gained a foothold within another less privileged application, or potentially through social engineering tactics that lead to the installation of malicious code with similar permissions, can exploit this misconfiguration. The core technical flaw lies in the lack of atomic operations and proper ownership checks when writing data to the clipboard buffer, allowing any process on the device to overwrite existing content without authentication or authorization verification from the legitimate user or the originating application.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly regarding confidentiality and integrity of user data. Clipboard functionality is frequently used for transferring sensitive information such as passwords, one-time passcodes, financial account details, private messages, and personal identification numbers between applications like messaging platforms, password managers, and banking apps. An unauthorized attacker leveraging this flaw can perform clipboard hijacking or injection attacks. This means they can replace legitimate content with malicious payloads designed to phish users when pasted into other contexts, such as a login field for an online bank account where the injected text might contain hidden characters or redirect links. Alternatively, the attacker could simply exfiltrate sensitive data by reading and forwarding it to remote servers if combined with read permissions that are also improperly granted. This undermines user trust and exposes individuals to identity theft and financial fraud.
This behavior aligns closely with MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to Input Capture via Clipboard API or Screen Content Capture, specifically focusing on the interception of data in transit between applications. It reflects a broader class of issues where mobile applications do not adhere to the principle of least privilege when handling shared system resources. The vulnerability highlights the risks associated with legacy clipboard implementations that rely heavily on file-based intermediaries rather than secure IPC mechanisms provided by modern operating systems like Android's ContentResolver or iOS' UIPasteboard which have stricter sandboxing rules.
Mitigation strategies must focus on enforcing strict access controls and adopting more secure data handling practices. The primary remediation involves updating the application to version 14.2 or later where these permission issues are resolved, ensuring that clipboard-related files are created with private mode flags so they cannot be accessed by other processes. Developers should also migrate away from file-based clipboard implementations toward using direct system APIs that handle memory buffers securely without exposing intermediate data on disk. Additionally, implementing input validation and sanitization for any data read from the clipboard can help mitigate secondary attacks where malicious content is pasted into vulnerable fields within the application itself. Users are advised to keep their applications updated to patch known vulnerabilities and to review app permissions regularly, revoking unnecessary access to storage or clipboard history if available through device settings. Security audits should prioritize checking for insecure file modes in all data persistence layers to prevent similar privilege escalation or information disclosure flaws in future releases.