CVE-2026-51831 in Backup for Windows
Summary
by MITRE • 10/29/2026
An issue in IDrive IDrive Backup for Windows Version 7.0.1.1 and below affected, remediated in Version 7.0.1.2 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via the id_service.exe component
Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/29/2026
The vulnerability identified within IDrive Backup for Windows versions up to 7.0.1.1 represents a critical security flaw located specifically within the id_service.exe binary, which serves as the core background service handling backup operations and system interactions. This issue fundamentally allows a local attacker with existing user privileges on the affected machine to execute arbitrary code with elevated permissions. The root cause of this vulnerability typically stems from improper validation or access control mechanisms governing how the service handles input data or interacts with other system components, potentially involving insecure deserialization, buffer handling errors, or flawed privilege escalation logic that permits lower-privileged processes to invoke high-level functions without adequate authorization checks.
From a technical perspective, local code execution vulnerabilities in backup services are particularly dangerous because these applications often operate with significant access rights to the file system and registry to perform their intended function of data preservation. An attacker exploiting this flaw could leverage the id_service.exe process to inject malicious payloads or execute commands directly within the context of the service account. This effectively bypasses standard user-level security boundaries, granting the adversary a foothold that is significantly more powerful than typical local privilege escalation techniques which rely on kernel exploits or misconfigured system services. The ability to run arbitrary code means an attacker can install backdoors, harvest credentials stored in memory or configuration files, disable security software, and move laterally across the network if the service account has broader domain permissions.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond immediate compromise of the local host. Since backup solutions often contain sensitive organizational data, successful exploitation could lead to the exfiltration of confidential information before it is encrypted or transmitted securely. Furthermore, an attacker gaining control over id_service.exe can manipulate the integrity of backups themselves, potentially corrupting recovery points or injecting malware into archived files that will subsequently be restored by other systems in the future. This creates a persistent threat vector where even after initial remediation on one machine, compromised backup archives could propagate malicious code to additional endpoints during restoration processes.
In terms of industry classification standards, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command and potentially CWE-269 Improvement of Privilege if the service runs under a high-privilege account such as SYSTEM or Administrator. From a tactical standpoint within the MITRE ATT&CK framework, exploitation would likely involve techniques associated with Local Process Injection (T1055) for code execution and Service Execution (T1569) to maintain persistence through the legitimate backup service mechanism. The attack path relies heavily on local access, which categorizes it under Initial Access or Lateral Movement depending on whether the attacker already has a foothold via phishing or network exploitation.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize immediate patching of IDrive Backup for Windows to version 7.0.1.2 or later, as this release explicitly addresses the identified flaw in id_service.exe. Organizations should verify that all endpoints running affected versions are updated promptly through centralized management consoles if available. In environments where patching is delayed due to operational constraints, strict application whitelisting policies can help prevent unauthorized execution of modified binaries masquerading as or replacing id_service.exe. Additionally, enforcing least-privilege principles for the account under which the IDrive service runs can limit the blast radius should an exploitation attempt succeed by reducing the permissions available within that process context. Regular auditing of running services and monitoring for unusual parent-child process relationships involving backup executables can also aid in early detection of such exploits before significant damage occurs.