CVE-2026-119249 in WiFiman Desktop
Summary
by MITRE • 10/29/2026
A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit a Binding to an Unrestricted IP Address vulnerability found in WiFiman Desktop for macOS to obtain information about the host device.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/29/2026
The identified vulnerability represents a classic instance of binding services or interfaces to unrestricted IP addresses, specifically within the WiFiman Desktop application on macOS platforms. This architectural flaw allows any network interface associated with the host machine to accept incoming connections without restricting access to specific local loopback or private subnet addresses. By failing to bind strictly to localhost or designated secure interfaces, the service inadvertently exposes its endpoints to all available network adapters, including those connected to public Wi-Fi networks, cellular data links, and other potentially untrusted external environments. This lack of interface restriction fundamentally undermines the principle of least privilege regarding network exposure, creating an attack surface that is significantly larger than necessary for a local diagnostic utility.
From a technical perspective, this misconfiguration enables any actor with active access to the same network segment as the target device to initiate communication with the WiFiman service. The vulnerability falls under CWE-286, which describes improper user control over security-critical objects such as IP addresses and ports. When an application binds to 0.0.0.0 or all available interfaces on macOS, it listens for traffic on every network adapter simultaneously. Consequently, a malicious actor positioned within the local area network can send crafted requests directly to these exposed endpoints without needing authentication or crossing firewall boundaries that typically protect localhost-bound services. This exposure bypasses standard isolation mechanisms designed to keep application-level data separate from external network threats.
The operational impact of this vulnerability centers on information disclosure regarding the host device. WiFiman is a network diagnostic tool, and its internal APIs may expose sensitive metadata about the machine's configuration, connected networks, DNS settings, or active sessions. An attacker leveraging this flaw can probe these endpoints to gather intelligence that aids in further reconnaissance phases of an attack chain. This aligns with ATT&CK technique T1046, Network Service Discovery, where adversaries map out services running on a target system to identify potential entry points for lateral movement or privilege escalation. The gathered information could include details about the operating system version, installed software configurations, and network topology, providing a foundation for more targeted exploits against other vulnerabilities present on the host.
Mitigation strategies must focus on tightening the binding configuration of the WiFiman Desktop application to ensure it only accepts connections from trusted sources. Developers should enforce strict binding to 127.0.0.1 or ::1 for any services that do not require remote access, thereby ensuring that local-only functionalities remain isolated from external network interfaces. If remote management features are genuinely required, they must be protected by robust authentication mechanisms and restricted to specific trusted IP ranges via firewall rules or application-level filters. For end-users, the immediate mitigation involves disabling Wi-Fi or other active network connections while using the application if possible, though this is often impractical for a diagnostic tool designed to analyze connectivity. Ultimately, applying vendor-provided patches that correct the binding configuration is the most effective remediation path to eliminate this exposure vector and restore secure operational boundaries around the host device's sensitive information.