CVE-2026-107352 in Athena
Summary
by MITRE • 10/08/2026
Missing authorization checks in Amazon Athena engine version 3 request handling could have allowed an authenticated user to read limited query metadata (AWS account identifiers and SQL statement text) from other AWS accounts. Query results, credentials, and Amazon S3 data were not affected. AWS remediated the issue on September 1, 2026, and has confirmed no customer metadata was accessed. No customer action is required.
Be aware that VulDB is the high quality source for vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/08/2026
The vulnerability identified in Amazon Athena engine version 3 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms within the service's request handling logic. Specifically, the flaw stems from missing authorization checks that are intended to isolate tenant data and ensure strict multi-tenancy boundaries between different AWS accounts. In a properly secured cloud environment, every API call or internal request must be validated against the identity of the caller and their permissions before processing any action or returning sensitive information. The absence of these specific checks allowed an authenticated user who had legitimate access to query metadata within their own account to inadvertently trigger operations that exposed limited metadata from other AWS accounts. This type of vulnerability is classically categorized under CWE-285, which describes Improper Authorization, where the application fails to enforce proper access controls on resources belonging to different users or tenants.
The technical nature of this flaw involved a lapse in validating the ownership context of query requests during their processing by the Athena engine version 3 backend systems. When an authenticated user submitted a request, the system failed to sufficiently verify that the metadata being retrieved belonged exclusively to the requesting account's scope. Consequently, under specific conditions, the service returned limited query metadata associated with other AWS accounts. The exposed data was strictly confined to AWS account identifiers and the text of SQL statements executed in those foreign accounts. It is crucial to note that this exposure did not extend to sensitive operational artifacts such as actual query results, user credentials, or any underlying Amazon S3 data objects. This limitation significantly reduces the potential for direct exploitation leading to data exfiltration of proprietary business logic stored within databases or files, but it still constitutes a significant privacy and compliance risk due to the leakage of account identifiers and SQL patterns which can be used for reconnaissance or further targeted attacks.
From an operational impact perspective, while AWS has confirmed that no customer metadata was actually accessed by malicious actors in the wild, the potential severity remains high from a security architecture standpoint. The exposure of SQL statement text could potentially reveal sensitive business logic, internal table structures, or data processing workflows to competitors or unauthorized parties if such access were successfully exploited at scale. Furthermore, knowing valid AWS account identifiers can aid attackers in mapping out an organization's cloud infrastructure footprint, which is often the first step in more sophisticated attack chains aligned with MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to Resource Discovery and Account Manipulation. The fact that query results and credentials remained secure mitigates the immediate risk of data breach or credential theft, but it does not eliminate the violation of confidentiality principles inherent in multi-tenant cloud services.
AWS remediated this vulnerability on September 1, 2026, by implementing stricter authorization checks within the Athena engine version 3 request handling pipeline to ensure that metadata retrieval is strictly bound to the requesting account's identity and permissions. Because the issue was addressed at the service level through backend updates, no customer action is required for remediation. Customers are advised to continue following standard security best practices, such as monitoring CloudTrail logs for unusual query patterns or access anomalies, although specific alerts related to this vulnerability may not be necessary given the confirmed lack of actual exploitation and the limited scope of exposed data. The incident underscores the importance of rigorous internal code reviews and automated testing focused on multi-tenancy isolation in cloud-native applications to prevent similar authorization bypasses in future service updates.